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Introduction
EXCERPTA E DiSSERTATioNiBUS iN PHiLoSoPHiA
Abstract: This dissertation is a study of the theme of 
divine providence in Richard Swinburne’s work. This 
consists principally in his response to the problem of 
evil. He argues that all evil that occurs is logically ne-
cessary if God is to give us all the goods that we value 
greatly. He suggests that the good that God brings 
about outweighs the evil that he permits and that this 
is the best that God could do. His aim is to show that 
the occurrence of evil does not count against theism. 
The thesis that is defended in the present work, fo-
llowing Thomas Aquinas, is that Swinburne’s theodi-
cy is inadequate and that any theodicy that does not 
take into account final causality will be inadequate. 
For a satisfactory theodicy, a more metaphysical ap-
proach to the problem of evil has to be employed. 
The thesis holds that a teleological concept of nature 
is indispensable in the recognition of the real goods 
and evils. This concept is the basis for the traditional 
understanding of evil as privatio boni, which the pre-
sent work defends. The thesis argues that this way 
of understanding evil solves many of the difficulties 
faced by Swinburne’s theodicy. It also means that 
Swinburne’s free-will defence, which necessitates the 
existence of evil as an alternative reality to the good, 
is not sustainable. The study also shows that it is his 
conceptions of good and freedom that make him 
reject some of the doctrines in the theodicy in the 
Christian tradition.
Keywords: Theodicy, Privatio Boni, Evil.
Resumen: Esta tesis es un estudio del tema de la pro-
videncia divina en el trabajo de Richard Swinburne. Su 
pensamiento sobre este tema consiste principalmen-
te en su respuesta al problema del mal. Argumenta 
que todo el mal que ocurre es lógicamente necesario 
para que Dios nos dé todos los bienes que considera-
mos valiosos. Swinburne sugiere que los bienes que 
nos otorga pesan más que los males y que esto es lo 
mejor que Dios puede hacer. Su meta es mostrar que 
la ocurrencia del mal no cuenta contra el teísmo. El 
presente trabajo defiende la tesis, siguiendo a Tomás 
de Aquino, que la teodicea de Swinburne es inadecua-
do y que cualquier teodicea que no tenga en cuenta 
la causalidad final será inadecuado. Para conseguir 
una teodicea satisfactoria, ha de emplearse un pro-
cedimiento más metafísico. La tesis dice que un con-
cepto teleológico de la naturaleza es indispensable 
para reconocer los bienes y males verdaderos. Este 
concepto es la base de la concepción tradicional del 
mal como privatio boni, que este trabajo defiende. La 
tesis argumenta que esta concepción del mal resuelve 
muchos de las dificultades que encuentra la teodicea 
de Swinburne. Además, implica que la «defensa de la 
libertad de la voluntad» de Swinburne, que hace ne-
cesario la existencia positiva del mal, no es sostenible. 
El trabajo muestra también que son sus concepciones 
del bien y de la libertad que le hacen rechazar algunas 
de las doctrinas de la teodicea en la tradición cristiana.
Palabras clave: claves: teodicea, privatio boni, el mal.
«Providence is concerned with the direction of things to an end. Therefore, as 
the Commentator says, whoever denies final causality should also deny provi-
dence.» 1 This affirmation gives perspective to the dissertation whose extract is 
presented in this work. The dissertation studies the theme of divine providence 
1 st. thoMas aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q.5, a.2, co. The translation used in 
this work is that of Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1952.
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in Richard Swinburne’s work from a Thomistic viewpoint. it endeavours to 
show that the absence of the concept of the ultimate good makes it highly diffi-
cult, not to say impossible, to explain and defend adequately God’s providence.
The central theme of divine providence, not to say the only one, in Swin-
burne’s work, is the problem of evil. He has developed a theodicy which he 
considers to be a satisfactory response to the atheistic objection to the exist-
ence of God. He says that if a theist «can provide for [bad] states of each kind 
a reason why God could justifiably allow a state of that kind to occur... he will 
have provided an adequate total theodicy.» 2 Failure to provide an adequate 
theodicy would be a setback for the justification of theism. According to him, 
it would be sufficient ground for the denial of the existence of God. 3 i argue 
in the dissertation that the theodicy he presents is insufficient because of the 
wrong conceptions of good, evil and freedom. i therefore propose an alterna-
tive from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective.
The present work does not deal directly with the main theme of the dis-
sertation but comprises of its first chapter (out of four chapters). This chapter 
has been selected because, on one hand, it presents a summary of Swinburne’s 
whole project of the justification of theism, and on the other, it relates the 
specific topic that was studied in the dissertation (i.e. God’s providence), to the 
whole project. The selected chapter presents and discusses Swinburne’s con-
ceptions of the divine attributes. its purpose was not to carry out an exhaustive 
study of Swinburne’s doctrine on the divine attributes but to put into context 
his doctrine on God’s providence. What he says about the other attributes 
is an indication of what kind of providence we can expect. i also present his 
views about the different arguments for or against the existence of God. This 
is necessary because the theme of divine providence arises, for Swinburne, 
in the context of the justification of God’s existence. Moreover, the role and 
solution that he gives to the problem of evil depend greatly on his views about 
what arguments are successful in proving the existence of God. Before dealing 
with these however, i have found it necessary to consider his epistemological 
presuppositions for it to be clear why he proceeds the way he does.
i wish also to present here what the other chapters of the dissertation 
deal with. Chapter ii deals with what we may say to be the only theme of 
2 swinburne, R., Providence and the Problem of Evil, 15.
3 Cf. ibid.
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providence for Swinburne: the problem of evil. it presents his theodicy, that 
is, his response to the ‘atheist’s argument’ against the existence of God on the 
account of there being evil in the world. This chapter also considers the log-
ical and philosophical difficulties that arise from his proposal. i argue that his 
theodicy compromises the divine attributes. i suggest here that the principal 
difficulty of Swinburne’s theodicy, which is the source of the other difficulties, 
is the concept of good (and evil) that he uses. it is a concept that does not 
recognise finality (i.e. that all things are good or evil in reference to an end). 
That is, the difficulties inherent in his theodicy have their root at his point of 
departure. This however is not proper to him but an inheritance of modern 
philosophy. The second chapter also contains a summary of some other con-
temporary views on the problem of evil in order to show that his main inter-
locutors use the same concept of good as he does.
For the same reason, while presenting an alternative concept of good in 
Chapter iii, i discuss not only his views but those of some other contemporary 
philosophers. The alternative concept that i propose in this chapter seeks to 
solve two main problems at the foundation of Swinburne’s theodicy, which 
will have become manifest in Chapter ii: the consideration of evil as having 
positive existence rather than as privatio boni; and the consideration of God’s 
goodness as moral goodness. The proposal that i make is just one more among 
many possible ones from a Thomistic point of view. The third chapter also 
includes a proposal, based on a teleological concept of nature, of a theodicy 
that judges all goods and evils in reference to the ultimate good.
in Chapter iv, i consider the concept of freedom. Here, i emphasise 
the intimate relation there is between the will (and therefore free will) and 
the good. This, then, is a particular application of the concept of good pro-
posed in Chapter iii to a topic of central interest to Swinburne’s theodicy. By 
following the contemporary debate –especially between compatibilism and 
incompatibilism– i argue that freedom does not require the choice between 
good and evil as two existing realities. This view is a point of departure for 
Swinburne’s theodicy. Finally, i consider the role that some themes which are 
traditionally considered under providence have in Swinburne’s doctrine.
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Richard Swinburne’s Theism
F or Swinburne, theism is «the claim that there is a God, understood in the way that Western religion (Christianity, Judaism and islam) has general-ly understood that claim.» 1 He says that this claim is logically equivalent 
to «there exists necessarily a person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who neces-
sarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and 
the creator of all things.» 2 He notes that by referring to God as ‘a person’, he 
oversimplifies the Christian view – the doctrine of the Trinity – in order to be 
fair to the Judaic and islamic views. 3 He asserts that in the search for a highest 
level theory, that is, a theory that explains everything that we observe, the view 
that there is a God is the best candidate. 4
i shall discuss, in this chapter, the terms included in Swinburne’s defini-
tion of theism and his views about our access to God (i.e. how and what we can 
know about his existence and attributes). This will help to put into context his 
conception of divine providence. i shall discuss his views about the attributes 
of God in Section 2. indeed from the definition, it can be noted that he recog-
nises as proper to God all the attributes that are traditionally referred to him. 
it will however become manifest immediately that he understands the attrib-
utes in peculiar and limited ways. Given however that the scope of this study 
is not Swinburne’s concept of God but of only one attribute (i.e. the divine 
providence), i shall limit myself to highlighting those peculiar aspects of his 
understanding of God that have some implication for the providence of God. 
 1 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 3.
 2 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 2 ed., Clarendon Press, oxford; oxford University Press, 
New York, 2004, 7.
 3 Cf. ibid., footnote 1.
 4 Cf. swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 2.
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The question that should arise is: What will be the extent of the providence 
by a God understood in Swinburne’s way?
in Section 3, i shall present his discussion of the arguments that have 
been formulated to defend the existence of God and his proposal of how we 
should go about this project. He considers ‘God exists’ as one more hypothe-
sis, which we can test following the same criteria that are followed in testing 
hypotheses in the positive sciences. 5 one aim of this chapter is to make man-
ifest the kind of results (the characteristics of God) to which this approach 
leads him. i shall suggest that a more metaphysical approach would give much 
better results, since metaphysics is the only scientific field that can provide 
grounding or a proof that is apt for the infinite. 6
However, before i present and discuss Swinburne’s considerations about 
the above ‘content’ of theism, i shall briefly present his epistemological sys-
tem in Section 1. it will include what he considers to be knowledge, the pro-
cess of justification of our beliefs and the nature of explanation. This will 
help understand why he proceeds the way he does in his defence of theism. 
This refers also to his considerations about divine providence, since like i 
have mentioned, the theme of providence arises for him in the context of the 
defence of theism. it is apparent – from the ample space that he dedicates to 
exposing his epistemology in Providence and the Problem of Evil, not to mention 
other books – that Swinburne himself considers it important.
1. JustiFication and knowledGe
According to Swinburne, knowledge is a fairly vague notion. 7 He affirms 
this during his discussion of the goodness of true belief. He asks himself 
whether true belief is any better if it amounts to knowledge: is true belief 
any better if it has that extra something, that is, a ‘warrant’ which turns it 
into knowledge? His answer is that it will depend on what ‘warrant’ it is. 
He notes that the warrant in an externalist theory of knowledge arises solely 
from something external to the subject. For example, reliabilism, which is the 
 5 Cf. swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 2.
 6 Cf. Moros, E. R., «Presupuestos de la demostración de la existencia de Dios», Scripta Theologi-
ca, 34 (2003) 431.
 7 swinburne, R., Providence and the Problem of Evil, 57.
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most common version of externalism, holds that a belief has a warrant when 
it is produced by a process such as perception which normally produces true 
beliefs. 8 Swinburne holds that, while it is a good thing that our beliefs satisfy 
the reliabilist requirement, a true belief will not be any more worth because 
of this. 9
on the other hand, «the core component of ‘warrant’ for an internal-
ist is ‘justification’. To amount to knowledge, a (strong) true belief must be 
‘justified’.» 10 Justification may be subjective (i.e. a matter of satisfying the 
subject’s own criteria) or objective (i.e. a matter of satisfying the true criteria). 
i present here below his discussion of the internalist sense – on which his 
epistemology is based – of both subjective and objective justification.
1.1. Subjective Justification
Each person normally has a system of beliefs that determine her way of 
thinking and working. it can however be asked whether someone holds onto 
a certain belief or group of beliefs ‘justifiably’ or ‘rationally’. The case being 
considered here is whether one is epistemically – rather than morally – justi-
fied to hold a certain belief. A belief is said to be justified «if and only if either 
(by the subject’s own standards of probability) it is rendered probable by the 
subject’s other justified beliefs or it is properly basic.» 11
He notes that the notion of ‘properly basic’ belief came to the philo-
sophical discussion through the work of Alvin Plantinga, according to whom 
it is a belief «which a subject is justified in holding quite apart from any 
support which it might gain from other beliefs.» 12 in the internalist sense, 
«a properly basic belief is one which is probably true because of its content 
alone, e.g. because it is a belief about what the subject is now perceiving.» 13 
it may however still be required by an internalist theory that a subject have 
certain other internal states such as sensations for it to be a properly basic 
belief. 14
 8 Cf. ibid.
 9 Cf. ibid., 58; 64.
10 Ibidem.
11 Ibid., 16.
12 Ibid., footnote 10.
13 Ibid., 16.
14 Cf. ibid., footnote 10.
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So, one is epistemically at fault if one’s beliefs do not fit together; that is, 
one is justified to hold a belief only if it is compatible with one’s other beliefs 
or it is forced upon one by what one is experiencing. if, for example, some-
one believes that there are some bad states in the world that are incompatible 
with the existence of God, then he is not justified to continue believing that 
God exists. on the other hand, if the beliefs that one has concerning certain 
bad states are such that they are not incompatible with the belief of the exist-
ence of God, he is justified to believe that God exists.
At this point, Swinburne introduces his ‘Principle of Credulity’, which 
he refers to as a supreme principle that covers the justification of belief in the 
internalist sense. it states that «other things remaining equal, it is probable 
and so rational to believe that things are as they seem to be (and the strong-
er the inclination, the more rational the belief).» 15 He adds a precision that 
when he says ‘seem’, he means ‘seem epistemically’, that is, the way we are 
initially inclined to believe that things are. He asserts that this must be the 
starting point for all justified belief because if all beliefs needed to be justified 
by other beliefs, no belief would ever be justified. «Without this principle, 
there can be no knowledge at all.» 16
According to the Principle of Credulity therefore, if it seems to me that 
i am seeing a table, i ought to believe this until evidence appears that i have 
been deceived. The principle not only applies to deliverances of sense but 
also to «the way things seem morally, mathematically, or logically.» 17 it must 
apply, for example, to apparent experiences of God: if it seems to you that 
you are aware of the presence of God, you ought to believe so until someone 
produces reasons to suggest otherwise. on the other hand, «if it seems to 
someone that there is some bad state incompatible with the existence of God, 
he ought so to believe, and so believe that there is no God – in the absence 
of counter-reasons.» 18
And since, according to Swinburne, a good agent ought to prevent any 
pain or suffering which he can prevent, it follows from the Principle of Cre-
dulity that any evil for which no greater-good defence can apparently be pro-
15 Ibid., 20.
16 swinburne, R., The Evolution of the Soul, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1986, 12.
17 swinburne, R., Providence and the Problem of Evil, 22.
18 Ibidem.
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vided must count against the existence of God. 19 in order to believe justifi-
ably or rationally that God exists, one needs to have «either strong positive 
evidence for the existence of God, or a record of discovering with respect to 
many apparent bad states that a theodicy works with respect to them, or a 
theodicy for each kind of bad state which seems to count against the existence 
of God.» 20
1.2. Objective Justification
A belief is said to be justified in the objective sense «either if it is ren-
dered probable by the subject’s other justified beliefs or if it is properly ba-
sic.» 21 it can easily be noted that this is the same characterisation that applies 
to the subjective sense, the only difference being that the subject must now 
operate by true criteria rather than her own criteria. in Swinburne’s terminol-
ogy, when a subject acts according to true criteria, she is justified2 while when 
she acts according to her own criteria, she is justified1. «[While] a subject may 
not be at fault in operating in accordance with her own criteria, clearly it is 
better if she operates by true criteria.» 22
«True criteria are the necessary a priori inductive criteria of what are 
the proper starting-points for belief, and of what makes what probable.» 23 
Swinburne adds that we all believe that there are true criteria for what is 
evidence for what. When we make an observation y and then conclude that z 
is probably the case, we do this following certain a priori criteria. He claims 
that we all think that these criteria are true and that almost everyone has a 
very similar view about what are the true criteria. 24 in Providence and the Prob-
lem of Evil, he gives three criteria that we normally follow in deciding which 
claims or hypotheses are more probable. i shall present them here below 
in the form in which he presents them in Is there a God? in this latter case, 
he gives four criteria used by scientists for deciding which proposed law of 
nature is justified to be considered as one or not. Nevertheless, he explains 
19 Ibid., 29.
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibid., 59.
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem.
24 Cf. ibid.
Alex MboniMpA
194 CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016
that the third criterion reduces to the second. He says that a hypothesis or 
claim is justified if:
(1) it leads us to expect (with accuracy) many and varied events which we 
observe (and we do not observe any events whose non-occurrence it leads 
us to expect),
(2) what is proposed is simple,
(3) it fits well with our background knowledge,
(4) we would not otherwise expect to find these events (e.g. there is no rival 
law which leads us to expect these events which satisfies criteria (1-3) as well 
as well as our proposed law). 25
it is a good thing that our beliefs be justified2 because then they are prob-
ably true. However, the only thing one can do towards this is to have justified1 
beliefs at every given moment. That is, we can only act according to criteria 
which seem correct to us at a given moment and which over time we can try 
to improve. 26 But Swinburne notes that in order to have an account of knowl-
edge in anything like the ordinary sense, internalism needs to add two further 
conditions: it needs to exclude the ‘Gettier effect’, that is, the justification of a 
true belief via some false belief; and secondly it must be based on its evidence 
and not only be coincidental. Justified true belief that fulfils all these condi-
tions is better than mere true belief. Hence knowledge in the internalist sense 
is better than mere strong true belief. 27
1.3. The Quest for an Ultimate Explanation
Men form beliefs from the phenomena that they observe. it is these be-
liefs that they strive to justify according to the process that i have presented 
in the previous sub-sections. Like i have noted, Swinburne considers that it 
is a good thing that our true beliefs should be justified. This way, they will 
amount to knowledge. Normally however, we do not stop at forming justified 
beliefs but ask ourselves what may be the cause of these phenomena (i.e. their 
explanation). Swinburne says that «human beings have always sought the true 
25 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 25.
26 Ibidem.
27 Cf. ibid., 62-64.
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explanations of all the events (all the phenomena) of which they know, have 
sought to discover the causes of events and the reasons why those causes had 
the effects they did.» 28
He classifies the explanations of the events that occur in the world into 
two kinds: scientific and personal explanations. «Scientific explanation in-
volves laws of nature and previous states of affairs. Personal explanation 
involves persons and purposes.» 29 Scientific explanation is about inani-
mate causation, while personal explanation is about intentional causation. 30 
He adds that humans have had sometimes practical aims and other times 
non-practical ones in their search for explanation. Moreover, this desire for 
explanation persists till they can get to the ultimate explanation (i.e. a ‘theory 
for everything’).
Swinburne defends theism as the best candidate for the ultimate expla-
nation. Before i present his justification (i.e. a rational explanation) of the 
hypothesis of theism in the next sub-section, i shall consider here below what 
he considers to be the nature of explanation. That is: what kind of explanation 
do we normally look for and how do we know that we have found it? When 
should we be satisfied and stop our search? This i hope should bring to light 
what kind of explanation he believes is sufficient to account for everything 
that exists and what kind he thinks is possible. This is a pertinent issue when 
we come to evaluate the kind of God and the kind of divine providence that 
he defends.
Let me take note of some important terminology before i proceed. Swin-
burne says that «the world consists of objects – or more technically, as philos-
ophers sometimes call them, substances.» 31 He says that the word ‘substance’ 
refers to an individual thing (i.e. this desk or that tree). Furthermore, sub-
stances have properties and have relations to other substances. A substance 
having a property or relation, changing its properties or relations, coming 
into existence or ceasing to exist is an event. 32 An event may also be called a 
phenomenon or a state of affairs. 33
28 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 21.
29 swinburne, R., «The vocation of a Natural Theologian», 189.
30 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 21.
31 Ibid., 20.
32 Cf. ibid.
33 Cf. ibid.; swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 23.
Alex MboniMpA
196 CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016
a) How Explanation Works
Swinburne believes that to say that someone has provided an explanation 
of the occurrence of some phenomenon (i.e. an event or state of affairs) is quite 
ambiguous. it may mean that he has provided a true explanation of the phenom-
enon or it may merely mean that he has suggested a possible explanation. How-
ever, when we seek explanations, we are not interested in any kind of explanation 
but in a true explanation. He says that to provide a true explanation of the occur-
rence of phenomenon E is to «state truly what (object or event) brought E about 
(or caused E), and why it was efficacious.» 34 That is, we have an explanation of an 
event when we have the cause (i.e. the what) and the reason (i.e. the why).
The cause of E may sometimes be a set of factors A... D and this means 
«at least that each, in the conditions of its occurrence, made it more physically 
probable that E would occur.» 35 He says that we may call all the factors together 
‘the cause’ or, more usually, we distinguish one of them as the cause and the 
others as the conditions. «[Which] we call the cause is sometimes a somewhat 
arbitrary matter.» 36 Swinburne calls «a set of factors that together were suffi-
cient for the occurrence of an event E a full cause of E.» He goes further to say 
that if there is a full cause C of E and a reason R that guarantees C’s efficacy, then 
there is a full explanation of E. 37 «in this case, the ‘what’ and ‘why’ together will 
deductively entail the occurrence of E.» 38 in contrast with a full explanation, 
«an explanation of E is only a partial one if the explanation includes factors that 
contributed to bringing about the occurrence of E (made it physically proba-
ble), but these factors did not necessitate the occurrence of E.» 39
Swinburne asserts that a full explanation F does really by itself explain 
why something happened. He thinks that we do not need to ask or to know 
whether there is an explanation of how the states it cites came to be or why any 
reasons it cites operate. He says that:
To suppose otherwise is to commit a fallacy that we may call ‘the completist 
fallacy’. For if it were really the case that F could not explain E unless there 
34 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 23.
35 Ibid., 24.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibid., 25.
38 Ibidem.
39 Ibid., 76.
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is an explanation of F, nothing in the universe could be explained, unless 
there were explanations of such things as the origin of our galaxy – which 
is absurd. 40
Swinburne says however that, although a full explanation of E leaves no 
facet of E unexplained, there is a special kind of full explanation «in which all 
the factors cited are such that there is no explanation (either full or partial) of 
their existence or operation in terms of factors operative at the time of their 
existence or operation.» 41 This he calls a complete explanation. He gives the fol-
lowing example of a complete explanation: 42 Let us suppose the full explana-
tion of a high tide to be the positions of the sun, moon, earth, water, etc. (i.e. 
the what) and the operation of Newton’s laws (i.e. the why). Now, if Newton’s 
laws are made to operate by the contemporaneous operation of Einstein’s laws 
of General Relativity and by the fact that this region of the universe is rela-
tively empty of matter; and if there is nothing else operating at this very time 
that makes the sun, moon, etc. be in these positions and make Einstein’s laws 
operate; then we have a complete explanation of the high tide in terms of the 
operation of Einstein’s laws, the universe in this region being relatively empty 
of matter, and the sun, moon, etc. being where they are.
Again he goes further to admit a special kind of a complete explanation. 
if we know, not only the factors that contemporaneously bring about E and 
which have no further explanation of their existence and operation, but also 
those that originally brought about E and which have no further explana-
tion of their existence and operation, then we have what Swinburne terms 
as an ultimate explanation. He says that these factors are ultimate brute facts. 
in brief, a complete explanation refers only to those factors C and R that 
have no explanation operating contemporaneously with the occurrence of E, 
while an ultimate explanation refers to those factors that have no explanation 
that may not be operating at the time that E occurs but originally brought 
about C and R. 43
Finally, he mentions what he calls an absolute explanation of E. This is «an 
ultimate explanation of E in which the existence and operation of each of the 
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibid., 78.
42 Cf. ibid.
43 Cf. ibid., 78-79.
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factors cited are either self-explanatory or logically necessary.» 44 He says how-
ever that he does not believe that there can be any absolute explanations for 
logically contingent phenomena. He believes that the arguments to the exist-
ence of God, which are the subject of the present discussion, are arguments to 
a complete explanation of phenomena. 45 They all claim that God’s intention at 
some time brings about certain phenomena at that time; and that nothing else 
at that time explains either his existence or his forming that intention. Given 
that God is perfectly free, his intention involved has no causal explanation and 
given that he is eternal, his existence at any time has no further explanation. 
Therefore, any complete explanation in terms of God’s intention at a time will 
also be an ultimate explanation.
So how do we know that we have reached a complete explanation? i shall 
present Swinburne’s answer to this question after presenting what he thinks 
are the grounds for judging an explanation to be true. But first i must reiterate 
his earlier position that a full explanation is sufficient in whichever inquiry 
that we carry on and that we need not go further. Thus, while he considers all 
the special kinds of explanation presented above, and while he believes that 
a ‘theory for everything’ has to be a complete explanation, he nevertheless 
believes that a full explanation is what we normally look for when we seek an 
explanation of the occurrence of a phenomenon. Swinburne gives an example 
of a long railway train in which each truck makes the next truck move. He sug-
gests that the «motion of the last truck is certainly fully explained by the mo-
tion of the last truck but one, even if there are other things to be explained.» 46
He contrasts his position with some positions that have been taken in 
classical philosophy. He says that Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas «are 
among the few philosophers of the past that devoted much thought to this 
matter of explaining one explanation by another, and the latter in turn by an-
other one.» 47 He disagrees with them however on their claim that there can-
not be an infinite regress of essentially ordered causes, that is, that there must 
needs be a first cause fully responsible for the whole series of causes. He says 
that this thesis is equivalent to claiming that any phenomenon that has a full 
explanation has a complete explanation. He says that Aquinas claimed that he 
44 Ibid., 79.
45 Cf. ibid., 80.
46 Ibid., 92.
47 Ibid., 90.
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could prove this thesis on a priori grounds but adds that Aquinas’ argument is 
not altogether clear. it seems to Swinburne that Aquinas’ argument attempts 
to find an ‘Aristotelian explanation’ and that this is tantamount to committing 
the completist fallacy. He says that Aquinas’ thesis may be true but he knows 
of no good a priori argument for it and that until it is provided, we should 
assume that it is not. 48
b) The Truth of an Explanation
i wish to present here the grounds on which an explanation is judged to 
be true. This, for Swinburne, is the same as saying how probable it is. i have 
already presented the criteria that according to Swinburne we follow in the ob-
jective justification of explanations (especially in the scientific context) 49. Swin-
burne defends his position using examples of laws and theories that have had 
some importance in the history of physical science. i wish to highlight these 
criteria here in a form that Swinburne applies them in weighing the different 
arguments that have been presented throughout history in favour or against the 
hypothesis ‘God exists’.
«[our] grounds for judging a proposed scientific explanation h of a phe-
nomenon E to be probably true, where e is our observational knowledge, 
which includes E, are the prior probability of h and its explanatory power with 
respect to e.» 50 The explanatory power of h depends on its predictive power 
and the prior probability of the evidence e (i.e. the probability of e if h were 
not true). A theory has high explanatory power when its predictive power is 
high and the prior probability of the evidence is low. The predictive power of 
a theory will be high if it renders very probable the observed behaviour. This 
will be the case if the phenomena that it predicts would not be expected but 
for it. Any other theories with significant prior probability should not predict 
the said phenomena nearly as well as the theory in question. 51 it may be seen 
that the two factors that determine the explanatory power are what are con-
tained in Criteria 1 and 4. 52
48 Cf. ibid., 90-92.
49 Cf. p. 34.
50 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 58.
51 Cf. ibid., 56-57.
52 Cf. p. 34.
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The prior probability of h is its probability before the evidence e that is 
cited in its support is taken into consideration. it depends on the degree of the 
theory’s fit with background knowledge and on its simplicity. it can be seen 
that these correspond to Criteria 2 and 3. However, as earlier highlighted, 
Swinburne believes that as we deal with theories of larger and larger scope, 
there will be less and less background knowledge with which these theories 
have to fit. More and more of the observational evidence will become part 
of the data that the theory has to explain. Hence, a ‘Theory of Everything’ 
will have no contingent background evidence by which to determine its prior 
probability. it must be determined by purely a priori considerations. Thus, the 
criterion of ‘fit with background knowledge’ does not affect our evaluation of 
theism and the other rival ‘theories of everything’. This leaves only the crite-
rion of simplicity as the determinant of the prior probability of fundamental 
theories. 53
The criterion of simplicity requires that a theory (e.g. a scientific theo-
ry) have few component laws, each of which relates few variables by mathe-
matically simple formulae. in addition, if it postulates objects or properties 
that are not observable (e.g. atoms, electrons, quarks), it should postulate as 
few new ones and new kinds as possible. Swinburne notes that this rule of 
postulating no more new objects than those needed to explain our obser-
vations is often called ‘ockham’s razor’. So, for example, it may seem that 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity does not look very simple, «but his 
claim for it was that it was the simplest among theories which yielded the 
data of observation.» 54
He further notes that the enormous importance of the criterion of sim-
plicity is not always appreciated: «Sometimes people ignore it and say that 
what makes a theory probable is just its explanatory power, or, worse still, just 
the fact that we can deduce from it statements reporting the phenomena that 
have been observed...» 55 He, on the other hand believes that «[without] the 
criterion of simplicity, we never have any way of choosing between an infinite 
number of theories compatible with data.» 56 He rejects the view of some writ-
ers who claim that our preference for simplicity is a matter of convenience and 
53 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 59-60.
54 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 31.
55 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 58.
56 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 30.
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has nothing to do with the truth. He argues that when we make predictions 
(e.g. that a bridge will not break if a lorry passes over it) by using the simplest 
theory, we really think that predictions based on this theory are more probably 
true than those of any other theory. Moreover, we often know that they are 
crucial for our survival or plans. He concludes that we do this only «because 
we regard the simplicity of a theory as crucial evidence of its truth.» 57
Having noted the grounds on which we judge an explanation to be true 
(i.e. the explanatory power and prior probability) and in what these consist, i 
shall now return to the question of how we know that we have reached a com-
plete explanation. it may be recalled that according to Swinburne’s definition 
of a complete explanation, it refers only to the factors acting contemporane-
ously with the occurrence of the phenomenon that is being explained. This 
question is relevant because Swinburne suggests that we should not inquire 
beyond this point even though the factors cited in a complete explanation may 
have other causes. He considers that there is no way of avoiding an infinite 
regress when seeking an explanation and that therefore we should have some 
grounds to determine the stopping point of explanation.
Swinburne suggests that we know that objects or reasons are a complete 
explanation, if we believe that they could only be explained further by postu-
lating causes and reasons (acting at the time) which do not have more explana-
tory power or prior probability than themselves. Thus these objects or reasons 
would be the terminus of explanation. We would be justified in believing that 
a theory was the terminus of explanation, if we had grounds for believing that 
any gain of explanatory power would be outweighed by a corresponding loss 
of prior probability or vice versa. He says that we would have these grounds if 
we already had a simple theory which fitted well with background knowledge 
and we had grounds for believing that any attempt to amend our theory or 
derive it from a more fundamental theory would make it very complicated or 
not fit with our background knowledge and yet lead to only a marginal gain 
of explanatory power. 58
With regard to the hypothesis of theism however, he affirms that the 
question of whether we ought to go beyond theism in order to provide a com-
plete explanation is irrelevant. He says that the only thing we have to estab-
57 Ibid., 31.
58 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 81-82.
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lish is whether theism has sufficient prior probability and explanatory power. 
«For, if theism is true, then, of logical necessity, God’s action provides a com-
plete and ultimate explanation of what it explains.» 59 What he means by this 
is that the properties that God is postulated to have are such that he must be 
an ultimate explanation. So, once we establish that the hypothesis is true (i.e. 
that it has sufficient prior probability and explanatory power), we need not ask 
further questions.
in The Existence of God and in other works he strives to show that theism 
has sufficient prior probability, which as i have highlighted he claims is basi-
cally a question of its simplicity. He also argues at length to show that theism 
has sufficient explanatory power, that is, that it makes the phenomena that we 
observe more likely than they would otherwise be. He does this by consider-
ing the different arguments for the existence of God and by claiming that the 
premises (i.e. the observed phenomena) from which they start are more to be 
expected if theism were true than if were not.
1.4. The Justification of Theism
a) The Simplicity of Theism
According to Swinburne, theism claims that every other object which 
exists is caused to exist, kept in existence and given all its properties by just 
one substance, God. Since the hallmark of a simple explanation is to postulate 
few causes, there could not be a simpler explanation than one which postulates 
only one cause. Theism is therefore to be preferred to polytheism since it is 
simpler. Moreover, theism postulates for this one cause, a person that has in-
finite degrees of those properties that are essential to persons: infinite power, 
knowledge and freedom. He adds that this is the hypothesis that there is a per-
son with zero limits, apart from those of logic. 60 And this person is called God.
Swinburne goes on to argue that to postulate that God has infinite power 
is a simpler hypothesis than the hypothesis that he has such-and-such lim-
ited power. it is simpler in the same way that scientists find the hypothesis 
that some particle has infinite velocity than the hypothesis that it has 301,000 
59 Ibid., 108.
60 Cf. ibid., 43-44.
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km/sec. «Scientists have always preferred hypotheses of infinite velocities to 
hypotheses of very large finite velocity, when both were equally compatible 
with the data. There is a neatness about zero and infinity that particular fi-
nite numbers lack.» 61 That is why, for example, Newton’s theory of gravity 
postulated that the gravitational force travelled with infinite velocity rather 
than some very large finite figure. Scientists only accepted that it travelled 
with finite velocity after Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity was adopted 
as the simplest and therefore preferable theory. 62Swinburne explains however 
that a person with zero powers would not be a person at all and that is why we 
postulate infinite rather than zero power for God. 63
Now, persons are substances with intentional powers, purposes and be-
liefs. So, Swinburne says, if the action of a person is to explain the existence of 
the entire universe, he must be very powerful. However, like it has been said 
above, it is a simpler hypothesis to postulate that his power is infinite than that 
it is very large. it naturally follows from this hypothesis of infinite power that 
this person should have no causal influences from outside him. The simplest 
hypothesis to hold therefore is that he has infinite freedom. in addition, in 
order to exercise power effectively, one needs to know the consequences of 
one’s actions. if the purposeful action of a person is to explain all the phenom-
ena in the universe, it is simplest to suppose that his understanding of things 
is unlimited. He must therefore be infinitely knowledgeable. God, according 
to theism, is a person that has these properties and has them essentially. if we 
said that God was all this accidentally, it would mean that God could abdicate 
if he chose to. We would then need to explain why he had not yet done so or 
what would happen if did. it is much simpler to postulate that he has these 
properties essentially. 64
Swinburne asserts that to suppose that God essentially has infinite power, 
freedom and knowledge, and these bound to eternity, is to postulate the sim-
plest kind of person there could be. Hence, theism provides the simplest kind 
of personal explanation of the universe that there could be (i.e. theism fulfils 
Criterion 2). 65
61 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 97.
62 Cf. swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 44.
63 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 97.
64 Cf. swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 45-46.
65 Cf. ibid., 47.
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b) The Limit of Scientific Explanation
Having considered the simplicity of theism, which is a personal explana-
tion with the specific characteristics that i have highlighted above (and which 
i shall present in more detail later on), i wish now to present how Swinburne 
contrasts theism with scientific explanation. often, he does this while defend-
ing the different arguments for the existence of God. He proceeds by claiming 
that the different observed phenomena from which these arguments start are 
better (or only) explained by theism than any scientific explanation.
Swinburne notes that our earth is one of several planets which travel 
around the sun, a small star, one of the many millions of stars in our galaxy. And 
our galaxy is one of thousands of millions of galaxies that are part of the phys-
ical universe. «it is extraordinary that there should exist anything at all. Surely 
the most natural state of affairs is simply nothing: no universe, no God, noth-
ing.» 66 He however notes that «by its very nature, science cannot explain why 
there are any states of affairs at all... But a God can provide an explanation.» 67 
This argument from the universe to God is the cosmological argument. it is an 
«argument from a complex phenomenon to a simple entity, which leads us to 
expect the existence of the former far more than it would be expected otherwise. 
Therefore, i suggest, it provides some evidence for its conclusion.» 68
in addition, that there are laws of nature is evident to everyone. The low-
er laws of nature are explained by higher more general laws, and these by the 
highest and most general laws. Swinburne notes that science cannot explain 
why there are most general laws of nature. it simply takes them as its premises. 
Furthermore, that there is an orderly universe is something that is beyond the 
capacity of science ever to explain. Swinburne notes that:
Science’s inability is not a temporal phenomenon caused by the backward-
ness of twentieth century science. Rather because of what scientific explana-
tion is, these things will ever be beyond its capacity to explain. For scientific 
explanations by their very nature terminate with some ultimate natural law, 
and the question with which i’m concerned is why there are natural laws and 
physical things at all. 69
66 Ibid., 48.
67 swinburne, R., «The vocation of a Natural Theologian», 191.
68 Ibid., 192.
69 Ibid., 193.
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Again in theism, we find a simple explanation. This argument from the 
orderliness of the universe to God is called the teleological argument. Howev-
er, the question to which the cosmological and teleological arguments respond 
does not stop only at asking why there are laws or matter-energy at all, but also 
asks why the laws and the matter-energy have the peculiar character of being 
already wound up to produce plants, animals and humans. 70. Science cannot 
provide an answer while theism can. Hence, «it is not a rational conclusion to 
suppose that explanation stops where science does, and so we should look for 
a personal explanation of the existence, conformity to law, and evolutionary 
potential of the universe. Theism provides just such explanation.» 71
in conclusion, in this section, i have taken note of Swinburne’s view that our 
true beliefs amount to knowledge when justified and that this is a greater good 
than mere true belief. By connecting the knowledge that we have about different 
phenomena, we are able to give explanations for these and other phenomena. 
The insatiable desire for explanation leads human beings to seek an ultimate 
explanation for all the phenomena that we observe (i.e. a ‘theory for everything’). 
However, this search for explanation that could potentially go on infinitely must 
stop once we reach a complete explanation. This is an explanation for all phe-
nomena that has the highest prior probability and explanatory power.
i have presented Swinburne’s justification of theism as the best candidate. 
His view is that it has the highest prior probability because it is the simplest the-
ory possible; and it has the highest explanatory power because, if a being with 
attributes as those postulated by theism exists, the probability that all the phe-
nomena that we observe occur, is high. i shall be presenting in more detail these 
attributes in Section 2 and the specific steps of this justification in Section 3.
2. the attributes oF God
Providence is indeed one of the divine attributes. it is however – and 
rightly so – usually understood as depending on other divine attributes espe-
cially on God’s omnipotence and omniscience. 72 The extent of the providence 
of any person depends on his power and knowledge. Hence, God’s providence 
70 Cf. ibid., 195.
71 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 68.
72 Cf. echavarría, A., «Providencia», in Diccionario de Filosofía, Eunsa, 2010, 946.
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will depend on how these attributes are understood. in addition, when talking 
about the providence of any person, we assume that the said person is good 
and has good purposes for his dependants. in other words, we assume that he 
is willing to employ his knowledge and power in favour of them. However, 
since God’s providence and goodness are the main subject of the dissertation, 
i shall not deal with them in this chapter but in the subsequent ones. i shall 
first of all present (in Sub-section 2.1) Swinburne’s views about the divine 
attributes that he includes in the definition of theism. Secondly, i shall discuss 
the interesting issues that arise (in Sub-section 2.2) in his consideration of the 
attributes, especially those aspects that may affect the divine providence. His 
peculiar views may lead theists to asking themselves, as Swinburne himself 
suggests, whether such a God is worthy of worship. 73
2.1. What Swinburne Says about the Attributes
a) God’s omnipresence
Swinburne’s definition of theism includes that God is a spirit. By this, 
he understands that God is «a non-embodied person who is omnipresent.» 74 
To say that God has no body is to «deny that there is any volume of matter 
such that by his basic actions he can control only it and such that he knows 
the goings-on elsewhere only by their effects on it.» 75 By his omnipresence 
God «can control by basic actions all states of affairs everywhere (in this or 
any other universe) without being dependent for that power on anything.» 76 it 
may be noted here that Swinburne recognises God’s spatial omnipresence. He 
does not however attribute a temporal omnipresence to God as will become 
apparent later on when i present his views about God’s eternity.
b) God’s omnipotence
To say that God is omnipotent means that he is infinitely powerful. it 
means that «he is able to do whatever it is logically possible (i.e. coherent 
73 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 95.
74 Ibid., 93.
75 Ibidem.
76 Ibid., 94.
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to suppose) that he can do.» 77 Thus, «whatever (logically possible) action he 
formed the intention to do, he would succeed in doing.» 78 This means that 
he cannot bring about any state of affairs, the description of which involves 
a logical contradiction (e.g. my existing and not existing at the same time). 
Swinburne explains that ‘me existing and not existing at the same time’ does 
not really describe a state of affairs at all, in the sense of something that it is 
coherent to suppose could occur. He says that there are also states of affairs 
that it is coherent to suppose that they could occur, but that it is not coherent 
to suppose God could bring about. He says, for example, that it is logically 
possible that ‘an uncaused state of affairs’ occur, but it is not coherent to sup-
pose that God could bring about, that is, cause an uncaused state. 79
c) God’s omniscience
God’s omniscience means that «he knows at any time whatever it is logical-
ly possible that he know at that time.» 80 There may be some true propositions 
that it is not logically possible that a person know at some time t, for example, 
propositions about some other person’s future free actions. Then to claim that 
God is omniscient is not to claim that he knows these propositions at t. Hence, 
Swinburne believes that God cannot know with certainty future free human ac-
tions. This position forms part of his free-will defence. 81 He admits that his view 
is opposed to the common position in the Christian tradition. 82 in the Christian 
tradition, it has been possible to claim that God knows everything including 
future contingent events because it was held that God was eternal in the sense 
that he was timeless or outside time. Swinburne however rejects this latter view 
as making no sense. 83 i shall present shortly his views about God’s eternity.
Furthermore, according to Swinburne, to say that God is omniscient is 
to say that he has infinite beliefs and that his beliefs amount to knowledge 
(i.e. they are true and justified). 84 He believes that it is more consonant with 
77 Cf. ibid., 7.
78 Ibid., 98.
79 Cf. ibid., 94-95
80 Ibid., 95.
81 i shall present Swinburne’s views on the free-will defence in Chapter iv.
82 Cf. swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1986, 219.
83 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 7.
84 Cf. pp. 31-35 for Swinburne’s views on what knowledge is.
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his omnipotence that his beliefs should amount to knowledge. otherwise, if 
he did not have true beliefs about the consequences of his actions, he could 
fail to realise some of his intentions. This would mean that he would not be 
omnipotent. Now, true beliefs fail to amount to knowledge only if they are 
true by accident. Here, Swinburne rules out the ‘Gettier effect’ with respect 
to God’s beliefs. He argues that, given the other divine properties, especially 
his omnipotence, God’s beliefs could not be false, and so could not be true by 
accident. 85
d) God’s Freedom
God is a perfectly free person. By this, Swinburne understands that «no 
object or event or state (including past states of himself) in any way causally 
influences him to do actions that he does.» 86 The choices that God makes and 
the intentions that he forms depend entirely on him at the moment of the 
choice alone. 87 He is not influenced causally by desires (i.e. by any external 
object). 88 Neither is he in any way predetermined to act in certain specific 
ways (i.e. he has no inbuilt probabilistic tendency). Swinburne asserts that it 
follows from God’s being omniscient and perfectly free that he is perfectly 
good. While human persons do not always do what they believe to be the best 
action because of the influence of desires, God being «[a] perfectly free person 
will inevitably do what he believes to be (overall) the best action and never do 
what he believes to be an (overall) bad action.» 89 i shall discuss God’s goodness 
when i come to considering Swinburne’s concept of the good in Chapter iii.
However, in spite of the above, whereby God is neither determined nor 
inclined by anything to any action, Swinburne argues on several occasions that 
some occurrences should be expected from God. in fact his arguments for the 
existence of God begin from God’s essence and try to show that we should 
expect God to bring about the events we observe. That is, from what we know 
(i.e. postulate) about God, it follows directly, with more or less degrees of 
probability, that the different phenomena should occur. This implies some 
85 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 98.
86 Ibid., 7.
87 Cf. ibid., 98.
88 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 7.
89 Ibid., 12.
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kind of determinism or in the very least what Swinburne terms as probabil-
istic tendency. An example is a response that he gives to D. H. Mellor when 
he objects to the claim that we can assign probabilities to God’s actions. 90 He 
agrees with Mellor in that we can assess the probability of a cheat having put 
the cards in the order in which they are in a bridge hand only if we could write 
in advance of looking at the cards in what order (s) a cheat would be likely to 
arrange them. 91 Swinburne responds that while we do not know which orders 
a cheat is more likely to put the cards and while all orders are equally likely a 
priori, when it comes to God, «we do have some idea of what kinds of world 
God is likely to create.» 92
e) God the Creator
By God being the creator of all things, Swinburne understands that «for 
all logically contingent things that exist (apart from himself) he himself brings 
about, or makes or permits other beings to bring about, their existence.» 93 
This indicates that God, although he is the cause of all that exists, is himself a 
contingent being. Swinburne says that God is responsible for the past, pres-
ent and future existence of material objects and of the natural laws that they 
follow. He is the source of the being and power of all other substances. And 
supposing that devils, angels and other universes exist, God also makes them 
exist and behave as they do or sustains the power they have in them. 94
Nevertheless, according to Swinburne, there is no contradiction in that 
‘an uncaused state of affairs’ occur. 95 Thus, the undifferentiated non-complex 
universe needs no explanation and therefore needs no creator. in claiming that 
the cosmological argument cannot be a deductive proof, he argues that if this 
were the case, it would be incoherent to affirm that a complex physical uni-
verse exists and God does not exist. He says however it is not incoherent since, 
even if God never existed, a complex physical universe could have formed 
from matter that always existed and was continually rearranging itself in vari-
90 Cf. Mellor, D. H., «God and Probability», Religious Studies, 5 (1969) 223-234.
91 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 131.
92 Ibid., 132.
93 Ibid., 94.
94 Cf. ibid.
95 Cf. ibid., 95.
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ous combinations. 96 Therefore, for Swinburne, it is possible for something to 
exist even without there being a creator.
Furthermore, Swinburne claims that God had the necessity to create. He 
argues that it is better for God to bring about the existence of something other 
than himself than not to bring about anything. From his perfect goodness, 
God always does the ‘best action’, where there is one. 97 Therefore, «God must 
bring about the existence of other things.» 98 He argues that this follows from a 
principle which Aquinas often invokes and sometimes attributes to Dionysius. 
The principle states that ‘goodness is by its nature diffusive of itself.’ He says 
that when the consequence that God must inevitably bring about the existence 
of things apart from himself becomes explicit, Aquinas backs away. He says 
that it is the wish to defend the normal Christian view – that God did not have 
to create anything – that prevents Aquinas from making the conclusion. 99
He claims that a «solitary God would be a bad state of affairs. God needs 
to share, to interact, to love...» 100 Since God must bring about something, 
Swinburne goes further to ask himself whether God can bring about other di-
vine beings. if he can, then the inevitability of God bringing about something 
could be satisfied by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. He suggests that in 
that case there would be no need for Aquinas to reject the Dionysian principle. 
Furthermore, he asserts that «if God can make other divine beings, he must 
surely do so.» 101 But if he cannot, then he must create more limited conscious 
beings with whom to interact in love. Swinburne’s view is that God can bring 
about other divine beings. He notes that in Christian doctrine, God the Fa-
ther bringing about the Son and the Spirit is not normally called ‘creating’. it 
is apparent however that for Swinburne it is only a choice of terminology and 
not that there is any difference. 102
Swinburne’s doctrine about God’s creation brings to the forefront many 
issues. Among them is the issue of God’s unity. He says that theism postulates 
one God because this is the simplest theory. 103 He does not seem to find any 
 96 Cf. ibid., 136-137.
 97 Cf. swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 12.
 98 Ibid., 117.
 99 Cf. ibid., 117.
100 Ibid.,119.
101 Ibidem.
102 Cf. ibid., foot note 7.
103 Cf. ibid., 97; Is there a God?, 43-44.
CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016 211
The Providence of God accordinG To richard Swinburne
problem with there being many divine beings apart from it being a complicat-
ed theory. in addition, what he understands by the infinity of God is brought 
to question. As has been noted, he suggests that divine beings (i.e. beings that 
have infinite power, knowledge, goodness, etc.) may be brought into existence 
by God. This claim raises a number of questions: is it possible that an infinite 
being be brought into existence? is it possible that there exist more than one 
infinite being? Swinburne believes that to say that God has infinite power, 
knowledge, etc. is simply to postulate the maximum degree of all the prop-
erties of God. We do this only because it is simpler to postulate an infinite 
amount than a large finite number. He explains that a very large finite number 
may account for all that we observe (i.e. may satisfy the requirements for what 
God ought to have) but an infinite amount is much simpler. 104
f) God’s Eternity
As earlier mentioned, the attribute of eternity has implications for under-
standing the omniscience of God. By ‘eternal’, Swinburne understands that 
God «always has existed and always will exist.» 105 God’s essence is eternal and 
this means that he is «a being of a kind such that if he exists at any time he ex-
ists at all times.» 106 He says he prefers «the understanding of God being eter-
nal as his being everlasting rather than as his being timeless.» 107 He notes that 
the latter is an alternative understanding common in the Christian tradition. 
However, as i have noted above, he rejects it. He considers it unnecessary for 
the theist to burden himself with this understanding and says that it is very 
difficult to make any sense of it. 108
He has three reasons for rejecting it. Firstly, he argues that understand-
ing God’s eternity as timelessness did not arrive in the Christian tradition until 
the fourth century. He seems to attribute the doctrine to St. Augustine when 
he says: «This doctrine of divine timelessness is very little in evidence before 
Augustine.» 109 He says that there are no signs of it in the old Testament. He 
104 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 97.
105 Ibid., 7.
106 Ibid., 96.
107 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 9.
108 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 7.
109 swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 217.
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adds that the same applies in general to the New Testament, even though 
there are occasional sentences that could be interpreted in terms of this doc-
trine. Secondly, it seems to him that the claim that God is timeless contains 
an inner incoherence and is incompatible with most things which theists wish 
to say about God. Thirdly, he believes that the reasons for which theists have 
wanted to assert the timelessness of God are not very good ones. 110
Swinburne presents Boethius exposition, which he says is the best-
known, of the doctrine that God’s eternity means that he is timeless. 111 How-
ever, he does not respond to any of its arguments. Nevertheless, he goes ahead 
to give three reasons why theists may want to consider God as timeless. He 
notes that first and foremost, a consideration that scholastics had in holding 
this doctrine seems to have been that it would provide the explanation of the 
doctrine of God’s total immutability. 112 Secondly, «[in] view of the general 
Christian tradition that God’s omniscience includes knowledge of future free 
human actions, the doctrine of timelessness does seem to have the advantage 
of saving the former doctrine against obvious difficulties.» 113 Swinburne says 
that a third reason may be one which he is not aware to have been put forward 
by the scholastics but which a modern man may have: A man might feel that a 
temporal being is less perfect because his mere existence in time would mean 
that he was continually losing parts of his existence all the while. That is, «[as] 
today ends and tomorrow begins, the being has lost today...» 114
g) God’s Necessity
in Swinburne’s definition of God, the term ‘necessarily’ appears twice. i 
present below what each of these refers to. Firstly, the theist claims that God 
possesses all the above properties in some sense necessarily. «To say that some 
being necessarily or essentially has certain properties is to say that without 
these properties he could not exist.» 115 Having these properties is essential 
to being the kind of being that God is. God «belongs to the essential kind of 
110 Cf. ibid., 220.
111 Cf. ibid., 216.
112 Cf. ibid., 218.
113 Ibid., 219.
114 Ibidem.
115 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 95.
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divine being.» 116 A divine being is «a person who is omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly free, perfectly good, and creator of all things.» 117 Swinburne explains 
that God could not, for example, suddenly cease to be omnipotent and con-
tinue being God.
Secondly, Swinburne’s definition affirms that God exists necessarily. 
While other things are dependent for their existence on other beings or exist 
by chance, «God could not not exist.» 118 He goes further to ask himself what 
sort of ‘could not’, that is, what sort of necessity is this. «[it] seems to me that 
a theist, if he is to worship a God worthy of worship, must hold that God’s ne-
cessity is necessity of the strongest kind that the being, described so far could 
possess.» 119 He believes that to «say that ‘God exists’ is necessary is [...] to say 
that the existence of God is a brute fact that is inexplicable – not in the sense 
that we do not know its explanation, but in the sense that it does not have 
one.» 120 What this means is that God is the terminus of the explanation of all 
phenomena observed. That is, if we postulate a being with the properties that 
God is said to have, we need no further explanation.
The necessity of God’s existence does not imply, for Swinburne, that 
‘God is a necessary being’. When he says that «God could not not exist,» he 
does not mean that there is a being called God who must of necessity exist. 
He on the contrary affirms that «any terminus to explanation of things logi-
cally contingent must be itself something logically contingent.» 121 So, «God 
could not not exist,» simply means that there must be a final explanation. This 
explanation does not however have to be a necessary one but only one with 
the greatest explanatory power and simplicity. Neither does God’s necessity 
mean that the proposition ‘God exists’ is necessary. He says that if it were nec-
essary, there would be a contradiction in affirming that ‘God does not exist’. 
He believes however that it is obvious that there is no incoherence in such a 
statement. 122
Thus, God’s necessity only amounts to the claim that his existence is 
a brute fact. According to Swinburne, this is the strongest kind of necessity 
116 Ibid., 96.
117 Ibidem.
118 Ibid., 95.
119 Ibidem.
120 Ibid., 96.
121 Ibidem.
122 Cf. ibid., 136.
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that can be granted to God. That is, it is «the strongest kind of necessity 
compatible with his being a logically contingent being.» 123 He says that such 
necessary existence is termed as factually necessary existence (in contrast to 
logically necessary existence). He insists that God’s existence is not logically 
necessary. Thus, while he believes that two of Leibniz’s arguments are the 
best cosmological arguments that there are, he nevertheless finds a problem 
with Leibniz’s claim that God is a metaphysically necessary being. Swinburne 
asserts that if this means that God is a logically necessary being, then Leibniz 
is mistaken. Furthermore, although he disagrees with Kant’s claim that the 
cosmological argument is an ontological argument in disguise, he neverthe-
less thinks that: if «the necessary being to which the cosmological argument 
purports to argue is a logically necessary being» 124, then Kant’s criticisms have 
force. Swinburne insists that «[there] can be no ‘absolute explanation’ of the 
existence of the universe.» 125 on the other hand, he says:
if however Leibniz’s metaphysically necessary being is not a logically ne-
cessary being, but the supreme brute fact, then his principle boils down to 
the simple claim that there is a terminus to explanation, that everything that 
has a full explanation has an ultimate, or at least a complete, explanation. 126
Swinburne rejects this alternative as well. i noted earlier, when i present-
ed his theory of explanation, that he considers that a satisfactory explanation 
needs not be a complete explanation. He goes further to note that Leibniz 
claims that the universe needs an explanation because it is not metaphysically 
necessary. He adds that Leibniz may be right but that he does not see how one 
can defend this claim except in terms of «greater simplicity and explanatory 
power of a potential explanatory hypothesis.» 127 i have also presented Swin-
burne’s view that the truth of any hypothesis or theory depends on these two 
factors and also that these determine our stopping point in the search of an 
explanation for any phenomena. 128 Swinburne says that Leibniz provides no 
arguments in terms of the above factors and so takes it upon himself to provide 
one in his The Existence of God.
123 Ibid., 96.
124 Ibid., 148, footnote 19.
125 Ibid., 148.
126 Ibid., 149.
127 Ibidem.
128 Cf. pp. 40-44.
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2.2. The Limits to the Attributes of God
According to Swinburne, theism is the hypothesis that «there is a per-
son with zero limits (apart from those of logic) to his power, knowledge, and 
freedom». 129 This means that logic is the first measure of everything including 
God. Now given that logic consists in the rules of thought, it means that the 
God who is subject to the limits of logic can only be as great as our thought 
can reach. i have referred above to an affirmation, which Swinburne makes 
while discussing the necessity of God. He says: «[it] seems to me that a theist, 
if he is to worship a God worthy of worship, must hold that God’s necessity 
is necessity of the strongest kind that the being, described so far could pos-
sess.» 130 Thus, Swinburne recognises that the kind of attributes that God is 
said to have will affect his worthiness of worship. in other words, if his attrib-
utes are limited excessively, such a being may end up somewhat less than God.
a) Limits of Theistic Personalism
Before i begin the discussion of Swinburne’s views on the divine attrib-
utes, i would like to take note of a division that Brian Davies makes among 
theists. This may help to understand Swinburne’s approach better. Davies says 
that «theism can be divided into at least two approaches to God... ‘classical 
theism’ and ‘theistic personalism.’» 131 He suggests that from the time of St. 
Augustine to that of G. W. Leibniz, «philosophers almost always worked on 
the assumption that belief in God is belief in classical theism.» 132 on the other 
hand, the main figures among the ‘theistic personalists,’ he says, are Alvin 
Plantinga and Richard Swinburne. He notes that «[their] writings and the 
writings of those who share their view of God, proceed from the assumption 
that, if we want to understand what persons are, we must begin with human 
beings.» 133 it is true, he admits, that they do not suggest that God is just like 
a human being. Rather, they think that while God is like human beings, he is 
also different from them.
129 swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 44.
130 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 95.
131 davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 3 ed., oxford University Press, New York, 
2004, 2.
132 Ibidem.
133 Ibid., 10.
Alex MboniMpA
216 CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016
Among other theistic personalists, according to Davies, are Charles 
Hartshorne, John Lucas, Richard Creel and Steven T. Davis. 134 He claims that 
«theistic personalists frequently reject almost all the tenets of classical the-
ism.» 135 He considers that the major difference between the two groups is in 
their approaches to the doctrine of creation. For classical theism, God «is the 
one (and the only one) who creates ‘from nothing’ (ex nihilo in the traditional 
Latin phrase).» 136 it is evident, from what i have reported, that Swinburne’s 
ideas on God as Creator are quite different from this. i shall try to highlight 
this in the discussion that i shall hold shortly.
in addition, according to Davies, many theistic personalists take classical 
theism’s emphasis on the difficulty of understanding God to be an exagger-
ation. Although they concede that God is a mystery, «they frequently imply 
that we can have some sense of what it is to be God since we know from our 
case what it is to be a person.» 137 This may be seen from Swinburne’s debate 
with D. H. Mellor that i reported earlier. 138 Swinburne claims that while, in 
the case of a cheat, we do not know which orders he is more likely to put the 
cards, and while all orders are equally likely a priori, when it comes to God, 
«we do have some idea of what kinds of world God is likely to create.» 139 Ac-
cordingly, we know what God will do much better than what a man will do. 
Davies notes that the attitude of classical theists is quite different.
Classical theists happily agree that God may be compared to things that we 
know. They also agree that he can be truly described using words which we 
employ when speaking of what is not divine... Yet classical theists also typi-
cally insist that none of this means that we therefore have a grasp of God or 
a concept which allows us to say that we understand what God is. 140
Davies suggests that theistic personalists more or less follow the ap-
proach that René Descartes uses to prove that ‘i exist.’ 141 Descartes says that 
it is absurd to doubt one’s existence as long as one is thinking. «i am a thing 
134 Cf. ibid., 10-14.
135 Ibid., 11.
136 Ibid., 2.
137 Ibid., 14.
138 Cf. p. 57.
139 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 132.
140 davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 7.
141 Cf. ibid., 14.
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that thinks... a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, 
and that also imagines and senses.» 142 Descartes adds that this thing is not 
anything bodily. Theistic personalists think that by following what Descartes 
did and supposing God to be less limited than what we know ourselves to be 
as persons, we might arrive at a fair comprehension of God. 143 These general 
ideas about the theistic-personalistic approach may be useful in the interpre-
tation of Swinburne’s conception of the divine attributes.
b) Limits to God’s Power and Necessity
it may be recalled that in his definition of the omnipotence of God, 
Swinburne stated that God can do whatever it is coherent to suppose that he 
can do. 144 This of course is true. Whatever is a contradiction, God cannot do. 
Contradictions are not things. Like Swinburne also notes, they have no entity. 
i have noted the example that he gives: ‘me existing and not existing at the 
same time’ does not really describe a state of affairs at all, in the sense of some-
thing that it is coherent to suppose could occur. Therefore, if we said ‘God can 
do everything’, it would be an adequate description of God’s omnipotence. We 
shall have excluded the contradictions even without need to add an exception 
clause of ‘whatever it is incoherent to suppose’.
on the other hand, the addition of this exception clause alters our under-
standing of God’s power. it does not leave space for God’s power to go beyond 
what we can think or know. it turns our knowledge (our thought) into the meas-
ure of God’s power. Logic takes prior position to God and therefore turns into 
his measure. i may here note that Jeremy Gwiazda suggests that Swinburne’s 
‘infinite’ properties are in fact limited. i shall present Gwiazda’s criticism and 
Swinburne’s reply later on. For now, i shall only note that the attribute of om-
nipotence is important in the understanding of providence and the problem of 
evil. This is made clear above all by the fact that the problem of evil is stated 
by most authors in these terms. They say that the occurrence of evil throws a 
shadow over the existence of a good and omnipotent being. Hence, limiting the 
omnipotence of God limits the universality of his providence.
142 descartes, R., «Meditations», ii, in Cress, D. A. (ed.), Discourse on Method and Meditations on 
First Philosophy, 3 ed., Hackett Publishing Company, indianapolis, 1993, 66.
143 Cf. davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 14.
144 Cf. p. 50.
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Likewise, it is important to consider God’s necessity. The views about 
it may determine the position that one takes about the problem of evil. it 
may be noted that, in his argument against evil, Swinburne works under the 
assumption that God’s existence is not necessary and cannot be shown to be 
necessary (i.e. it cannot be demonstrated). Hence, he considers that there is 
no «positive evidence of sufficient strength for the existence of God» 145 and 
so we need a rational argument (e.g. the theodicy that he proposes) to under-
mine the inference of the non-existence of God from the occurrence of evil. if 
God’s existence could be shown to be necessary, the occurrence of evil would 
not put any doubt on the existence of God. Thus, Davies suggests that one 
reply to the problem of evil can be that we already know that God exists – if 
we are already certain about it – and so the occurrence of evil in no way entails 
his non-existence. 146
i have reported that Swinburne limits the necessity of God’s existence to 
a kind of necessity that he calls factual. This means to him that the existence of 
God is a brute fact that is inexplicable. By a brute fact, he means that ‘God’ is a 
complete explanation. ‘God’ however is just one complete explanation. There 
may be other complete explanations. And when he says that it is inexplicable, 
he means that we cannot explain his existence in terms of factors (causes and 
reasons) simpler and with greater explanatory power than the hypothesis of 
theism. 147 Like i noted, he claims that this is the strongest kind of necessity 
compatible with his being a logically contingent being. He asserts that God’s 
necessity cannot be logical necessity, which is «the only sense of necessity rec-
ognised since Hume» 148 among the Anglo-American philosophers.
So, what are the implications of the claim that God is a contingent be-
ing? it means, for Swinburne, first of all, that our inference of his existence 
is not necessary but simply that it is probable (i.e. it has great explanatory 
power and is simple). Secondly, it means that it is coherent to think and to say 
that God does not exist. 149 He claims that there is no contradiction between 
saying this and that ‘the physical universe exists.’ He appeals to the criterion 
of coherence, which is one of the determinant criteria in modern philosophy. 
145 swinburne, R., Providence and the Problem of Evil, 24.
146 Cf. davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 211.
147 Cf. pp. 43-44.
148 Moros, E. R., Modalidad y esencia: La metafísica de Alvin Plantinga, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1996, 40.
149 Cf. p. 84.
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So, despite all that we observe (man and the physical universe), according to 
Swinburne, it is possible for God not to be (not to exist).
However, if it is possible for God not to exist, that he exists depends 
on something or someone else. Who or what is it? only what is necessary 
needs no explanation. That is, we do not ask for the cause of what cannot be 
otherwise. on the other hand, if something can be otherwise, we ask for the 
cause (explanation) of its being the way it is. in response, we may say that 
Y is the cause of X; and then we may in turn ask for the cause of Y, and so 
on. in order to avoid an infinite regress, we must posit an uncaused cause, 
Z. This would be a necessary being because he could not not be. otherwise, 
there would not be anything at all. St. Thomas Aquinas, like i shall present 
in greater detail during the discussion of deductive proofs, considers that 
an argument along these lines can be a demonstration of the existence of 
God. 150 Swinburne does not think so since he does not think that it is pos-
sible to avoid the infinite regress in explanation, nor does he think that it is 
important to avoid it. 151 Many authors, including in the analytical context 
consider that the infinite regress is a problem that cries out for explanation. 
one of these is Robert M. Adams. Although he does not concede that we 
must necessarily posit an uncaused cause (a being without explanation), he 
agrees that to postulate a necessary being is an answer that settles the ques-
tion of the infinite regress.
Belief in a Necessary God has the advantage that the regress-threatening 
question, ‘But who made God?’, does not arise, or receives the speedy an-
swer that God’s existence has an explanation in its necessity. This answer is 
not as satisfying as it would be if we understood what makes God’s existence 
necessary. But it is at least a way in which we can say that there is an expla-
nation, and one that does not generate an infinite regress. 152
i suggest that, by claiming that everything that exists is contingent, Swin-
burne leaves our desire for explanation unsatisfied. What would be special 
about God that would make other beings depend on him if he is as contingent 
as they are? How can all contingent beings depend for their existence and op-
150 Cf. st. thoMas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, i, q.2, a.3; Summa contra Gentiles, i, 13, par 33.
151 Cf. pp. 43-44.
152 adaMs, R. M., «Presumption and the Necessary Existence of God», Noûs, 22 (1988) 30.
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eration on another contingent being? 153 By removing the necessary being (i.e. 
God), we remove everything!
[The] existence of God defines the minimum of metaphysical possibility 
required, such that if God never existed in a possible world, such a world 
would not be metaphysically possible... The inexistence of God is thus a 
black hole which makes any other metaphysical possibility disappear. 154
Besides, by claiming that the physical universe, which is all that we ob-
serve, could exist even if God did not exist, 155 Swinburne expressly defeats 
his purpose. it seems to me that this basic premise nullifies whichever other 
explanations that he may give for defending the existence of God. Why would 
we need to affirm the existence of God as the cause of the universe if the uni-
verse did not need God in order to exist? if a complex physical universe could 
have formed from matter that always existed and was continually rearranging 
itself in various combinations, why then do we need to posit God as the expla-
nation of its existence? This seems, moreover, to defeat his theory of simplici-
ty which states that one should not postulate more objects than are necessary. 
if the universe is sufficient in itself, there is no need then to postulate a cause, 
one moreover that is less evident to us than the universe.
How is it possible for Swinburne to affirm that God is a logically contin-
gent being despite all else that he says about God (especially about his infinite 
attributes)? it is because, for him, God is simply a hypothesis postulated in 
order to explain the contingent phenomena that we observe. ‘God exists’ is 
a terminus of other hypotheses that explain what we observe. And according 
to him, an explanation of contingent phenomena cannot itself be other than 
contingent. Enrique Moros, who compares Swinburne’s position with that of 
Alvin Plantinga, observes that:
while Swinburne conforms himself with the modern notions of coherence, 
demonstrability, rationality, etc., Plantinga tries to modify and widen them 
in an attempt to get rid of the metaphysical scepticism in the Anglo-Ameri-
can philosophy since Hume. 156
153 Cf. p. 52.
154 Moros, E. R., El argumento ontológico modal de Alvin Plantinga, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1997, 116. The 
translation is mine.
155 Cf. p. 84.
156 Moros, E. R., El argumento ontológico modal de Alvin Plantinga, 119.
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Hence, Plantinga is able to admit the notion of metaphysical necessity or 
broadly logical necessity. on the other hand, Swinburne seems to consider the 
notion of metaphysical necessity to be meaningless. Moros suggests that there 
«seems to be at the bottom of this a metaphysical and theological scepticism, 
an inheritance of Humean tradition.» 157
i have up to this point endeavoured to show that any rational inquiry 
about the explanation of the real existence of what we observe points to the 
metaphysical necessity of God’s existence. That is, from the necessity of being 
(esse) present in all things that we observe, we are able to arrive at the necessi-
ty of a being that has not received being but to whom it is proper to be. 158 i wish 
now to return to Swinburne’s assertion that God’s existence cannot be logi-
cally necessary. At this point, i wish to defend the view that God’s existence 
is also logically necessary. That is, the proposition ‘God exists’ is necessary. i 
shall rely on the consideration that St. Thomas Aquinas makes concerning the 
necessity of propositions. ian Logan says that St. Thomas considers a propo-
sition to be evident (per se nota) and necessary if it is impossible to be thought 
to be otherwise. 159 This, he says, is because the predicate is included in the 
essence of the subject. Swinburne agrees with this. Swinburne however, in 
considering logical necessity, neglects an aspect which St. Thomas highlights 
by a distinction he makes. Aquinas says that a proposition may be per se nota 
in itself though not to us or on the other hand, per se nota in itself and to us.
if, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the 
proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first prin-
ciples of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one 
is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. if, 
however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is 
unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who 
do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. 160
Now, we do not know the essence of God and therefore the proposition 
‘God exists’ will not be per se nota to us. However, according to Aquinas, it 
157 Ibid., 118.
158 Cf. st. thoMas aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Ch. 4, par. 7.
159 Cf. loGan, i., Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of Anselm’s Argument and its Significance 
Today, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham (UK), 2009, 138.
160 st. thoMas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, i, q.2, a.1, co.
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may be demonstrated that the predicate in this proposition is the same as the 
subject. 161 This is the position that i defend in this work. once the demonstra-
tion is carried out, this proposition becomes evident and necessary. There may 
however be some who may consider that such a demonstration is not possible 
but accept that existence belongs to the essence of God. To these also, the 
proposition ‘God exists’ is necessary.
«The proposition ‘God exists’, differs from a principle such as ‘the whole 
is greater than the part’, which is per se notum through an immediate percep-
tion and does not have to be demonstrated.» 162 The difference lies in that the 
terms ‘whole’ and ‘part’ are well known to everyone (i.e. to the wise and to 
the unwise). if however there were anyone so unwise that he did not know the 
meaning of the terms ‘part’ and ‘whole,’ then the principle ‘the whole is great-
er than the part’ would be per se notum in itself but not to him. Such a person 
could deny this principle without there being any contradiction. Similarly, 
someone to whom it has not been demonstrated that existence pertains to the 
essence of God can deny coherently that God exists. Therefore, a proposition 
may at first hand appear not to be logically necessary but when in fact it is. 
This is the case with the proposition ‘God exists.’
in short, for Swinburne and many other contemporary philosophers, 
logical necessity is the supreme, if not only, kind of necessity. «For this rea-
son, there can never be a necessity of the existence.» 163 on the other hand, the 
writers in the classical metaphysical tradition considered that the things that 
exist have some necessity in them. They, just like the ordinary people, consid-
ered that the things that are, cannot not be. That is, the being (esse) of things is 
evident and necessary. At the same time, they claimed that we almost imme-
diately grasp that the esse is not proper to the material things that we observe 
but must have been received from Another. The created world points to the 
necessity of a Creator. This way, the classical philosophers reached the con-
clusion of the necessity of God’s existence. Thus, ángel L. González, while 
commenting on St. Thomas’ five ways, notes that «the metaphysical ascent 
up to God always has its start in the consideration of creatures inasmuch as 
they are caused beings which reclaim an uncaused cause.» 164 i shall return to 
161 Cf. ibid.
162 loGan, i., Reading Anselm’s Proslogion, 138.
163 Moros, E. R., Modalidad y esencia: La metafísica de Alvin Plantinga, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1996, 40.
164 González, A. L., Teología Natural, 93.
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this when i deal with the deductive proofs. However, at this point, we can 
make a preliminary conclusion that if the existence of God is necessary and 
can be shown to be necessary, that there is evil will not bring into doubt God’s 
existence.
c) Limits to God’s Creation
So, from the creature, we are led to the Creator. From dependent and 
contingent being, we are led to pure and necessary being. For the philosophers 
and theologians in the Christian tradition, there is nothing that is that could 
have come about without the will of God (i.e. not created by God). «God, 
for classical theism, is the one (and the only one) who creates ‘from nothing’ 
(ex nihilo in the traditional Latin phrase).» 165 The distance between non-be-
ing (nothingness) and being is infinite. only an infinite being can overcome 
it. This is omnipotence. 166 on the other hand, according to Brian Davies, 
although all theistic personalists agree that God is the Creator, they tend to 
causally distance God from the world. They regard him as an onlooker with 
reference to the created order, who is able to step in and modify how things 
are. They also think that God does not have to create everything himself but 
may permit another being to do it. 167 He says that this may be noted, for ex-
ample, from what Swinburne says he understands by God being the creator 
of all things. 168
Moreover, when classical theism claims that everything that is has re-
ceived being from God and is dependent on him, it does not refer only to 
the physical universe but also to morality and logic. Morality and logic are 
rooted in the nature of the things created by God. i argue, in Chapter iii of 
the dissertation, that morality has to do with the proper ends of agents (i.e. 
it depends on these). Swinburne, on the other hand, believes that logic and 
morality are necessary and independent of whether God exists or not. For 
St. Thomas, there is a total dependence of everything that is on God and the 
understanding of the relation Creator-creature is the key to all else that we 
165 Cf. davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 2.
166 Cf. polo, L., Presente y Futuro del Hombre, Rialp, Madrid, 1993, 138-139.
167 Cf. davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 12.
168 Cf. p. 52.
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might understand about God. Jean P. Torrell summarises St. Thomas’ view of 
God’s creation as follows:
He is certainly not the only Christian thinker to have developed a creatio-
nist view of the universe following the book of Genesis but he has probably 
done it with greatest vigour. To say that the world is created signifies that it 
is entirely, in each and every element, in a relationship of total dependen-
ce on God. The originality of his thought is that this total dependence is 
accompanied by an equally total autonomy, since God respects the proper 
constitution of each creature and allows it to act according to its own laws. 169
in addition, St. Thomas considers that the universality of the divine 
providence necessarily follows from God being the Creator of everything. He 
thus comments:
Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of 
the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows 
that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be 
subject to divine providence. 170
So, inasmuch as all things have received existence from God, so are they 
subject to divine providence. According to J. M. Arroyo, for St. Thomas, to say 
that God is Creator implies that God is the universal provider because esse, which 
is received in creation, is what is most intimate to any being. 171 Hence, limiting 
God’s creation would also limit his providence. in the same vein, Agustin Echa-
varría links the metaphysical notion of providence that was developed within 
the Christian tradition to the understanding of God as the Creator of all things: 
«only a God-Creator, inasmuch as he is the cause of the being of all things, is 
capable of not only producing and conserving them in existence and sustaining 
their actions, but also of ordering and directing them towards the good.» 172
While presenting what it means to Swinburne that God is the Creator of 
the universe, i not only highlighted his view that the universe could have existed 
even if God never existed, but also his view that God had necessity to create 
169 torrell, J. P., St. Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, i, 2 ed., translation by Robert 
Royal, The Catholic University Press, Washington, D.C., 2005, 163.
170 st. thoMas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, i, q.22, a.2, co.
171 Cf. arroyo, J. M., El tratado de la providencia divina en la obra de Santo Tomás de Aquino, Pontificia 
Universitas Sanctae Crucis, Facultas Theologiae, Roma, 2007, 512-515.
172 echavarria, A., «Providencia», 945. The translation is mine.
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conscious beings. i suggest that this latter view shows that the limits of logic 
imposed by Swinburne not only limit God’s power and his other attributes but 
also make him dependent on us. Since ‘God’ is the terminus of a logical process 
(a final hypothesis that explains other hypotheses), he depends on this process. 
Since God is dependent on thought, thinking subjects are necessary if God is to 
exist. This leads to a great paradox: the creation is necessary while the Creator is 
not necessary. This however is not surprising if in the method of inquiry, God is 
simply a hypothesis that we postulate as a final explanation. Even if we show that 
the hypothesis is simple, has great explanatory power and has no incoherence, 
but we make no reference to reality, such hypothesis does not show that God 
exists. He is simply a result (a creation) of the logical process.
Further questions that arise from Swinburne’s considerations about God’s 
creation are God’s infinity and unity. on one hand, he claimed that God could, 
and probably must bring to existence, other divine beings. His objective is to 
give a rational justification of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Hence, Swin-
burne in his earlier writings referred to the ‘second God’ and ‘third God.’ He 
decided however to drop the terms due to the controversy that they raised. 173 
William Hasker observes: «Swinburne’s view of the Trinity does imply that the 
Son and the Holy Spirit are created, even though they are beings of a very dif-
ferent sort than all other individuals that God has created.» 174 Hasker concludes 
that this «opens a significant breach between Swinburne and the main trinitar-
ian tradition.» 175 it is clear that the one divine being that brings into being the 
other divine beings would be the source of being of the others and therefore 
greater than them. if the one that confers being is infinite, then the ones that 
receive their being (existence) cannot be also infinite. The ones that receive be-
ing will be composed of essence and being and so their being will be limited by 
its essence. only one who is pure being is infinite.
in any case, although Swinburne admits the possibility of there being 
more than one God, he postulates that there is only one God because this is a 
simpler hypothesis. The only explanation that he has for monotheism is that 
it is a simpler hypothesis than polytheism. However, according to his theory 
of simplicity, sometimes we need to postulate other beings in order to explain 
173 Cf. hasker, W., Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, oxford University Press, New York, 2013, 
153.
174 hasker, W., Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 153.
175 Ibidem.
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sufficiently well what we observe. 176 Now, when we come to the issue of evil, 
which is the main subject of the present study, it seems that it would be quite 
reasonable to postulate another infinite being responsible for the evil. it is 
much simpler that we attribute the evil that occurs in the world to another 
being rather than to the perfectly good being. Moreover, it should be noted 
that Swinburne concedes that the argument from evil against God is a good 
C-inductive argument (i.e. it counts against the existence of God). 177 it is ap-
parent therefore that there are more compelling criteria than simplicity which 
lead theists to affirm that there is only one God and that the evil that occurs is 
permitted by him and not by any other being.
d) Limits to God’s Knowledge
The logical limits that Swinburne places on God’s knowledge not only 
limit our understanding of God but they also have significant consequences 
for his providence. He says that God’s omniscience means that «he knows at 
any time whatever it is logically possible that he know at that time.» 178 That 
is, he will know only what we think that a person can know. only what is co-
herent to us that a person can know is what God will know. Here, Swinburne 
makes no distinction in the possibilities that different kinds of persons may 
have. But, isn’t it possible that a divine person may know more than what 
human persons can know, including what may not seem coherent to us that 
he may know? in fact, if this were not the case, such knowledge would not be 
different from human knowledge and so would not be infinite.
By this limitation of God’s knowledge, Swinburne normally wants to de-
fend the view that God cannot know with certainty future free actions of an-
other person. This view is an essential part of his free-will defence, whereby 
human beings are fully responsible for the evil they cause. Hence, Swinburne 
explains that «it may be that there are true propositions that it is not logically 
possible that a person know at some time t.» 179 He affirms that we should not 
expect God to know such propositions at time t. He believes that God’s om-
niscience only allows him to know with the highest degree of probability pos-
176 Cf. swinburne, R., Is there a God?, 43-45.
177 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 266.
178 Ibid., 95.
179 Ibidem.
CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016 227
The Providence of God accordinG To richard Swinburne
sible, at any given time t, what action a person is likely to perform freely at a 
future time t+1. 180 Thus, as part of his defence of God, Swinburne claims that 
God will not know incorrigibly the consequences of all actions (his and those 
of other free beings). Therefore, God can be held responsible only for the 
objectively likely consequences of his actions and not the actual consequences.
on the other hand, he thinks that Alvin Plantinga complicates his ‘free-
will defence’ and makes it less plausible by trying to defend God’s knowledge 
of everything including future free human actions. «Plantinga holds this be-
cause he holds to a strong traditional view of God’s essential omniscience, 
as God knowing all true propositions; and combines this with the view that 
God is not timeless but everlasting.» 181 The solution that Plantinga chooses 
is the claim that God’s omniscience includes ‘middle knowledge,’ a position 
that has its origins in the seventeenth century Jesuit, Luis de Molina. i do not 
think that this position is adequate. However, it is not within the scope of the 
present work to discuss its merits. i shall on my part highlight the merits of St. 
Thomas’ view inherited from Boethius. i think that it is the one that responds 
most adequately to God’s infinite perfection.
Like i have noted, Swinburne admits that his view differs from the unan-
imous view in Christian tradition that God’s knowledge has no limit either 
in time or in space. Accordingly, God knows everything including the secret 
inner thoughts of all persons and all their future actions. This view has been 
justified in the Christian tradition by the way God’s eternity was understood 
(i.e. as atemporal). Hence Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, follow-
ing the classical conception of eternity, explain that God does not foreknow 
‘future contingent events’ because it is impossible that any event be future to 
an eternal entity. 182 Similarly, to the question, ‘Can God change the past?’ they 
respond with a firm ‘no.’ They clarify however that:
it is misleading to say, with Agathon, that not even God can change the 
past... The impossibility of God’s changing the past is a consequence not of 
the fact that what is past is over and done with but rather of the fact that the 
past is solely a feature of the experience of temporal entities. 183
180 Cf. swinburne, R., Providence and the Problem of Evil, 6.
181 Ibid., 128.
182 Cf. stuMp, E. and kretzMann, N., «Eternity», in Stump, E. and Murray, M. J. (eds.), Philo sophy 
of Religion: The Big Questions, Malden (Massachusetts); Blackwell Publishers, oxford, 1999, 52.
183 Ibid. on Agathon’s affirmation, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, vi, 2, 1139b 10.
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Accordingly, God knows our future actions, not because he foreknows 
them but simply because they are present to him. Swinburne, on the other 
hand, believes that he can easily get rid of this way of understanding God’s 
eternity. Because of this, he claims that «the view that God’s omniscience in-
cludes knowledge of future free human actions is easily detachable from the 
theistic tradition.» 184 However, from the discussion that will follow shortly, it 
will be seen that he does not succeed in doing so.
For now however, it should be noted that a lack of knowledge about the 
future events will limit God’s providence for such events. This is so because, 
like St. Thomas explains, providence depends on knowledge of the means 
and the end. 185 This limit on God’s providence means that it will only be as 
much as the providence of a man. Swinburne thinks that God’s knowledge of 
future events is greater than our knowledge because God knows with greater 
probability than us what is likely to happen. it follows from this that God’s 
providence will be greater than ours only in the way that one country pro-
vides for its citizens better than another country because it has a more so-
phisticated statistical-probabilistic apparatus. Now, this kind of providence 
is not what is attributed to God. Rather, God’s providence is supposed to be 
universal.
in addition, Swinburne says that God’s omniscience means that he has 
infinite beliefs and that his beliefs amount to knowledge. «Beliefs are freely 
attributed to God nowadays in Anglo-American philosophical theology.» 186 
William P. Alston notes that this practice undoubtedly is part of the twenti-
eth-century popularity of the view that knowledge consists of true justified be-
lief. i suggest, again, that this is a conception of God’s knowledge that results 
from limiting it to human standards. Like Brian Davies notes, Swinburne and 
other theistic personalists normally assert that «God’s knowledge of history 
may partly be acquired by him as history unfolds. on their picture, God’s 
knowledge of the world, especially the world of human affairs, is capable of 
increase.» 187
Thus, while rejecting God’s immutability, Swinburne says that «if God 
did not change at all, he would not think now of this, now of that. His thought 
184 swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 219.
185 st. thoMas aquinas, De Veritate, q.5, a.1, co.
186 alston, W. P., «Does God Have Beliefs?», Religious Studies, 22 (1986) 287.
187 davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 12.
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would be one thought which lasted for ever...» 188 For Swinburne, God’s knowl-
edge proceeds from one belief to another and then a connection between dif-
ferent beliefs. He takes God’s knowledge to be rational (i.e. discursive) just 
like human knowledge. if this however were the case, it would mean that God 
progressively acquires knowledge and so continually changes. Richard Gale, 
who considers Swinburne’s theodicy unsuccessful, rightly notes that: «Swin-
burne seems unaware that this way of restricting God’s omniscience creates 
an especially virulent instance of the paradox of perfection.» 189 i shall shortly 
argue that indeed Swinburne’s conception of God’s omniscience is opposed to 
his infinite perfection. it is because Swinburne understands God’s knowledge 
this way that he finds great difficulty in accepting the conception of God’s 
eternity as omnipresence to all places and times.
Considered as an atemporal mind, God cannot deliberate, anticipate, re-
member or plan ahead, for instance; all these mental activities involve time... 
But it is clear that there are other mental activities that do not require a 
temporal interval or viewpoint. Knowing seems to be the paradigm case; 
learning, reasoning, inferring take time, as knowing does not. 190
e) Limits to God’s Perfection and Eternity
The present heading is a continuation of the discussion of Swinburne’s 
conception of God’s omniscience. i shall focus on the most controversial issue 
that arises in this discussion: the eternity of God. This issue also brings to 
the forefront our understanding of God’s perfection, immutability and omni-
presence. The Christian tradition in claiming that God knows future events 
(including future human actions) relied on an understanding of God’s eternity 
which was the result of philosophical and theological reflection on the attrib-
utes of God. God’s eternity was understood as God being outside time. This 
view was considered to be a direct consequence of the immutability of God, 
which in turn follows necessarily from God’s infinite perfection.
Swinburne, on the other hand, rejects this kind of understanding of eterni-
ty but admits that it has «the advantage of saving the former doctrine against ob-
188 swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 214.
189 Gale, R., «Swinburne on Providence», Religious Studies, 36 (2000) 213.
190 stuMp, E. and kretzMann, N., «Eternity», 51.
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vious difficulties.» 191 He thinks that God’s being eternal ought to be understood 
as his being everlasting rather than as his being timeless. God’s being everlasting 
would simply mean that he «always has existed and always will exist.» 192 He 
notes that claiming that God is timeless or ‘outside time’ has more serious im-
plications. He believes that it is unnecessary that the theist burden himself with 
these implications. He adds moreover that it is very difficult to make any sense of 
this claim. i have already presented the objections that he has against this view. 193
Swinburne’s first objection to understanding God’s eternity as ‘timeless-
ness’ is that this doctrine is absent in the Christian tradition until the third or 
fourth century. He claims that it is not to be found in the biblical writings but 
rather due to neo-Platonic influence. it is not within the scope of this study 
to carry out a biblical exegesis or a historical study of the development of the 
biblical concepts. However, i should only take note of the fact that specu-
lative reflection on the Christian Sacred Scriptures and doctrine has been a 
progressive process. For example, fundamental Christian dogmas (e.g. about 
the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus) did not acquire their explicit and definitive 
formulation until the fourth or fifth century. it should therefore not surprise 
us that the doctrine of timelessness was not explicitly formulated – supposing 
that it was not – before the third century.
Neither is it surprising that the Christian tradition employed neo-Pla-
tonic concepts in explaining theological doctrines. it has always been the case 
that Christians have taken advantage of philosophical concepts of their times 
in order to define Christian doctrines with precision. it should be noted that 
Swinburne has set for himself a similar task: that of elucidating and explaining 
the philosophical issues present in different Christian doctrines. 194 Hence, the 
present study is about examining the suitability of Swinburne’s concepts for 
this task. Therefore, that a Christian doctrine about God has developed with 
the help of neo-Platonic or any other philosophical concepts is no objection 
against its Christian authenticity.
it has been argued by writers in the Christian tradition that what are 
successive moments to men – from the time that men first existed and forev-
191 swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 219. The former doctrine that he refers to is God’s knowl-
edge of future human actions.
192 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 7.
193 Cf. p. 55.
194 Cf. swinburne, R., Providence and the Problem of Evil, back cover.
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er – are to God all in one. They are present to him. This is part of the omni-
presence of God. Swinburne reports Boethius’ exposition of the doctrine in 
his Consolation of Philosophy as follows:
God, Boethius says, is eternal, but not in the sense that he has always exis-
ted and always will exist. Plato and Aristotle thought that the world had 
always existed... But even if [they] had been right, that would not mean that 
the world was eternal in the sense in which God is eternal. ‘Let us say that 
God is eternal, but that the world lasts for ever. God, however, is eternal 
in being present at once to all times which from our view at any one time 
may be past or future. God is thus outside the stream of temporal becoming 
and passing away. Boethius’s much-quoted definition of eternity is that it 
is ‘the complete and perfect possession at once of an endless life’. ‘For it is 
one thing to be carried through an endless life which Plato attributed to the 
world, another thing to embrace together the whole presence of an endless 
life, a thing which is the manifest property of the divine mind.’ The obvious 
analogy is to men travelling along a road; at each time they can see only the 
neighbourhood on the road where they are. But God is above the road and 
can see the whole road at once. Taking man’s progress along the road as his 
progress through time, the analogy suggests that while man can enjoy only 
one time at once, God can enjoy all times at once. God is present to all times 
at once, just as he is present to all places at once. 195
This is Boethius’ view as exposed by Swinburne. it seems to me a good 
explanation of how God is present to all times. Moreover, it explains that 
God’s omnipresence not only refers to space but also to time. on the oth-
er hand Swinburne acknowledges God’s omnipresence but limits it to space. 
That Boethius’ argument is a good one is also shown by the fact that Swin-
burne does not challenge any of its claims. The only way he seems to chal-
lenge it is by his affirmation that the claim that God is timeless contains an 
inner incoherence. This is the first part of his second objection according to 
the way i have summarised them. i present here what he considers to be the 
incoherence:
The inner incoherence can be seen as follows. God’s timelessness is said 
to consist in his existing at all moments of human time – simultaneously. 
Thus he is said to be simultaneously present at (and a witness of) what i 
195 swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 216.
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did yesterday, what i am doing today, and what i will do tomorrow. But 
if t1 is simultaneous with t2 and t2 with t3, then t1 is simultaneous with t3. 
So if the instant at which God knows these things were simultaneous with 
both yesterday, today and tomorrow, then these days would be simultaneous 
with each other. So yesterday would be the same day as today and as tomo-
rrow – which is clearly nonsense. 196
it should be noted that Swinburne simply repeats the argument of his 
opponents and only adds that it is clearly nonsense. of course it would be 
nonsense if the person that we were talking about were a human person. Swin-
burne seems not to take into consideration this difference and what it entails. 
This becomes manifest from the other part of his second objection: He says 
that «so many things which the theist wishes to say about God – that he brings 
about this or that, forgives, punishes, or warns – are things which are true of a 
man at this or at that time or at all times.» 197 indeed these things are true of 
a man because he is subject to time and experiences the moments of his life 
successively. on the other hand, God’s eternity is ‘the complete and perfect 
possession at once of an endless life’, as Boethius says. Swinburne’s opponents 
claim that to a divine person it is not incoherent that a man’s yesterday, today 
and tomorrow be all at once. This is the claim that Swinburne repeats in his 
argument above but he does not show that it is incoherent to suppose this of 
a divine person.
William Hasker believes that Boethius’ conception of God’s eternity, 
which, in general lines, is the one used by almost all classical philosophers, 
is «coherent and intelligible.» 198 He further thinks that the understanding of 
God’s knowledge in the classical way follows from it. He argues that «the 
mode in which God knows temporal entities need not be the same as the 
mode in which they exist,» 199 in the same way that God does not need to have 
a skin in order to know what it is like to be hit in the face with a snowball. 
Similarly, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann agree with Boethius that 
whatever has the complete possession of its life cannot be temporal, «since 
everything in the life of a temporal entity that is not present is either past and 
196 Ibid., 220.
197 Ibid., 221. The italics are mine.
198 hasker, W., «From God, Time and Knowledge», in Stump, E. and Murray, M. J. (eds.), Philo-
sophy of Religion..., ibid., 1999, 57.
199 Ibid., 56.
CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016 233
The Providence of God accordinG To richard Swinburne
so no longer in its possession, or future and so not yet in its possession.» 200 
They note that none of the classical philosophers who accepted eternity as a 
real atemporal mode of existence, with the possible exception of Parmenides, 
denied the reality of time. The classical philosophers simply proposed two 
separate modes of existence.
Swinburne’s third and last objection against the timelessness of God is 
that the reasons that theists give for asserting God’s timelessness are not good. 
it should first of all be noted that if the arguments that i have given in re-
sponse to his first two objections succeed in showing that the objections are 
not compelling, then this last objection does not count. For, it does not matter 
which reasons they have had provided their assertion is not shown to be false. 
Still, it may be noted that the first reason which he gives is that the scholastics 
thought that it would provide the explanation of the doctrine of God’s total 
immutability. Swinburne however does not think that God’s total immutabili-
ty needs explanation since he thinks that theists do not have to hold that God 
is totally immutable. 201
However, if we consider why the scholastics held that God had to be 
totally immutable, it would become easily understandable why it is neces-
sary to hold this position. if we did not hold that God was totally immutable, 
we would compromise his infinite perfection. For, anything that changes be-
comes either better or worse, more or less perfect than its previous state. This 
is what philosophers and theologians in the Christian tradition have sought 
to deny about God: that he may become more or less perfect than he is. God 
cannot become less perfect because in that case, his new state would not be 
the most perfect that any being could be. on the other hand, he could not be-
come more perfect because it would mean that his actual perfection is not the 
maximum possible. This is what they mean by claiming that all his perfections 
are infinite. This denies the possibility of adding anything to God’s perfection. 
Hence, St. Thomas argues that:
[Everything] which is moved acquires something through its movement, and 
attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, com-
prehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He can-
not acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was 
200 stuMp, E. and kretzMann, N., «Eternity», 44.
201 Cf. swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 212-215; 219.
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not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, 
some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the 
first principle was immovable. 202
it does not seem that we could consider something that is in a state of 
change to be perfect. We should therefore find it reasonable that St. Thomas 
agrees with the ancients who saw God’s immutability as a necessary conse-
quence of his infinite perfection. Finally, for completeness’ sake, let me men-
tion the other two reasons that Swinburne says that theists had for asserting 
God’s timelessness. The second is that it safeguards the general Christian 
tradition that God’s omniscience includes knowledge of future free human 
actions. it is clear that God’s knowledge of future free human actions fol-
lows from his timelessness. Swinburne acknowledges this. 203 The third reason 
which Swinburne gives is part of the first one (i.e. that a temporal being is 
imperfect).
in summary, Swinburne rejects the understanding of God’s eternity as 
timelessness or omnipresence to all times. one consequence of this rejection 
is Swinburne’s assertion that God cannot know future human actions. Given 
that providence depends on knowledge and that it is not about the past but 
what is to come, this view seems to rule out God’s providence over human ac-
tions. Besides, this view greatly compromises God’s perfection since it implies 
that he changes continually. i have on the other hand presented both classical 
and contemporary views which affirm that understanding God’s eternity as 
timelessness is not only coherent but also necessary for safeguarding his in-
finite perfection.
3. the arGuMents For the existence oF God
Throughout human history, many people have taken for granted God’s 
existence – and probably many others, his non-existence – without con-
sciously formulating reasons for their beliefs. 204 Swinburne notes that others 
have formulated the reasons for their belief in explicit forms. And some 
202 st. thoMas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, i, q.9, a.1, co. it should be noted that ‘movement’ is 
used in a wider sense to refer to all change.
203 swinburne, R., Coherence of Theism, 219.
204 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 8.
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formulations which have been frequently discussed have been given names 
(e.g. the cosmological, ontological arguments). Swinburne has presented 
and analysed in several of his works the arguments that are given in favour 
or against the existence of God. He has consistently defended the rationality 
of theism.
in this section, i shall present his views about the different types of argu-
ments, which ones he considers to be good ones and how he thinks we should 
proceed if we are to prove the rationality of theism (in Sub-section 3.1). i shall 
then discuss these views and present some criticisms that have been made 
about them (in Sub-section 3.2). i shall discuss and defend the classical view of 
the possibility of the demonstration of the existence of God. This discussion is 
important because Swinburne deals with providence, which, for him, is above 
all the problem of evil, in the context of the defence of the existence of God. 
The problem of evil arises because it seems to be an obstacle to rationally 
believing that there is an omnipotent and provident Being. His views on what 
kinds of arguments for the existence of God are good influence greatly the 
role (and solution) that he gives to the problem of evil.
3.1. What Swinburne Says about the Arguments
in his book, The Existence of God, which he considers to be «the central 
book of all that [he has] written on the philosophy of religion,» 205 he presents 
eleven arguments for or against the existence of God. He says that he selects 
these from the various a posteriori arguments that have had the greatest ap-
peal in human history. He thinks that only these eleven have considerable 
force. of these, only one – the argument from the existence of evil – is against 
the existence of God. He notes that atheistic arguments, apart from the one 
from evil, are largely criticisms of the theist’s arguments.
a) The Types of Arguments
The arguments that he considers in The Existence of God, he says, are all 
a posteriori arguments, that is, «arguments which claim that something that 
humans experience is grounds for believing that there is a God or that there 
205 Ibid., v.
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is no God.» 206 He says that he does not discuss a priori arguments, that is, 
«arguments in which the premisses are logically necessary truths – namely, 
propositions that would be true whether or not there was a world of physical 
or spiritual beings.» 207 He explains that because of this, he does not discuss 
the ontological argument and its variants. He believes moreover that «onto-
logical arguments for the existence of God are very much mere philosophers’ 
arguments and do not codify any of the reasons that ordinary people have for 
believing that there is a God.» 208
He notes that the greatest theistic philosophers of religion have generally 
rejected ontological arguments and relied on a posteriori ones. He gives the 
example of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus, he says, in reaching the final conclu-
sion about how probable it is that there is a God, he assumes that no a priori 
arguments and no a posteriori arguments other than the ones he discusses have 
any significant force. 209
b) The Possibility of a Proof
Before presenting Swinburne’s evaluation of the arguments for or against 
the existence of God, i wish to consider his views on whether a proof of the 
existence of God is possible. Like Anthony Kenny lamented over 40 years ago 
about the lack of interest and confidence in the possibility of a rational argu-
ment among contemporary philosophers 210, so does Richard Swinburne. Kenny 
attributes the philosophers’ disinterest to a belief that Kant had discredited all 
kinds of proofs definitively. 211 Likewise, Swinburne blames immanuel Kant and 
David Hume for the prevailing scepticism among contemporary philosophers. 
These philosophers worked to show that reason could never reach justified con-
clusions about matters much beyond the range of immediate experience.
He notes that many other philosophers have in recent years argued in the 
same spirit: «there is today deep scepticism about the power of reason to reach 
a justified conclusion about the existence of God.» 212 Swinburne however be-
206 Ibid., 8.
207 Ibidem.
208 Ibidem.
209 Cf. ibid., 9.
210 Cf. kenny, A., The Five Ways, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1969, 2.
211 Cf. ibid., 3.
212 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 2.
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lieves that Hume and Kant are mistaken. He defends the view that human 
reason can reach justified conclusions outside the narrow boundaries drawn 
by these philosophers. He suggests that recent developments in philosophy 
«especially developments in inductive logic, often called confirmation theory, 
provide tools of great value for the investigation» 213 of the existence of God.
He believes however that, «although reason can reach a fairly well-justi-
fied conclusion about the existence of God, it can reach only a probable con-
clusion.» 214 He sees an advantage in this in that it leaves «abundant room for 
faith in the practice of religion.» 215 He quickly dismisses any possibility of a 
deductive proof because «relatively few philosophers today would accept that 
there are good deductive proofs.» 216 While he strongly defends the cosmolog-
ical argument as a good argument in favour of the existence of God that starts 
from evident facets of experience, he nevertheless thinks that it is «equally 
evident that no argument from any such starting points to the existence of 
God is deductively valid.» 217 He considers Aquinas’ first four of his ‘five ways’ 
«to be one of his least successful pieces of philosophy.» 218 He argues that if an 
argument from the existence of a complex physical universe to the existence 
of God were deductively valid, then it would be incoherent to assert that a 
complex physical universe exists and that God does not exist. Swinburne does 
not think that it is. He asserts that:
it seems easy enough to spell out in an obviously coherent way one way in 
which such a co-assertion would be true. There would be a complex physical 
universe and no God, if there had always been matter rearranging itself in 
various combinations, and the only persons had been embodied persons; if 
there never was a person who knew everything, or could do everything, etc. 
Atheism does seem to be a supposition consistent with the existence of a 
complex universe, such as our universe. 219
Similarly, Swinburne believes that no teleological argument, whether 
Aquinas’ fifth way or any other argument, can be a good deductive argument. 
213 Ibid., 2.
214 Ibidem.
215 Ibidem.
216 Ibid., 14.
217 Ibid., 136.
218 Ibidem.
219 Ibidem.
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The reason he believes this is so is that although the premise (i.e. that a vast 
pervasive order characterises the world) is undoubtedly correct, the step from 
premise to conclusion is not a valid deductive one. He adds that although «the 
supposition that one person is responsible for the orderliness of the world is 
much simpler and so more probable than the supposition that many persons 
are responsible,» 220 the latter supposition seems to be logically compatible 
with the data. He says that the same kind of considerations apply to all the 
other arguments and for that reason he does not repeat them but simply as-
sumes that they are not deductively valid.
c) The inductive Probability of Theism: Swinburne’s Procedure
Having highlighted Swinburne’s rejection of the possibility of a deductive 
proof of the existence of God, i now proceed to present the procedure that he 
believes should be followed in carrying out this task. As i have already noted, 
he thinks that confirmation theory (i.e. contemporary inductive logic) avails 
the tools necessary for carrying out rigorously a rational justification of the-
ism. He appeals to its success in the scientific field. He notes that arguments of 
scientists from their observational evidence to conclusions about what are the 
true laws of nature or predictions about results of future experiments are not 
deductively valid but are inductive arguments. 221 So, this inductive procedure, 
which has afforded such remarkable success in the scientific field should be 
able to do the same in testing the hypothesis ‘God exists.’
Swinburne presents two kinds of inductive arguments. A correct P-in-
ductive argument is «an argument in which the premisses make the conclu-
sion probable.» 222 A correct C-inductive argument is «an argument in which 
the premisses add to the probability of the conclusion (that is, make the con-
clusion more probable than it would otherwise be).» 223 He says that obvious-
ly among correct C-inductive arguments, some will be stronger than others 
(i.e. some premises will raise the probability of a conclusion more than other 
premises). He believes that for rational discourse, it is not sufficient that an 
argument be valid or correct. it should, in addition, be a good argument. A 
220 Ibid., 155.
221 Cf. ibid., 5.
222 Ibid., 6.
223 Ibidem.
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deductive, P-inductive or C-inductive argument is good if its premises are 
not only true but are also known to be true by those who dispute about the 
conclusion. 224 in the arguments for or against God, he considers whether each 
argument from the observed phenomena to the conclusion ‘God exists’ is a 
good C-inductive argument. And then finally, he considers whether the argu-
ment from all the evidence taken together to the conclusion ‘God exists’ is a 
good P-inductive argument.
Swinburne thinks it unfortunate that there has been a tendency in re-
cent philosophy of religion to treat the arguments for the existence of God 
in isolation from each other. He notes that among «those who have assumed 
that there are no good arguments other than deductive ones, and that ar-
guments are not cumulative, are both (the early) Alasdair Macintyre and 
Anthony Flew.» 225 He says that there is no problem with initially treating 
each argument in isolation for simplicity’s sake. He adds that the fact that 
arguments may support and weaken each other is even more evident when 
dealing with inductive arguments. He thus makes the case for taking into 
consideration the cumulative effect of all arguments in favour of or against 
any given hypothesis. i shall return to this argument and the example he uses 
to defend it later on.
i have up to this point presented some preliminary considerations by 
Swinburne about the inductive procedure and how it can be applied to argu-
ments for the existence of God. i shall now go on to the specifics of how he 
proceeds in his own argument. The hypothesis that is under consideration 
here and whose probability Swinburne seeks to establish is ‘God exists’. The 
evidence includes those observable phenomena from which the arguments in 
favour or against the existence of God start. He says that when trying to es-
tablish the inductive probability of a hypothesis, the hypothesis up for inves-
tigation is often represented by h. He explains that it is often useful to divide 
the evidence available into two parts: new evidence and background evidence. 
The former is normally represented by e and the latter by k. The background 
evidence is that knowledge that is taken for granted before new evidence turns 
up. He says that the division between new evidence and background evidence 
can be made where one likes but that it is often convenient to include all 
224 Cf. ibid.
225 Ibid., 12, footnote 10.
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evidence derived from experience in e and to regard k as being what is called 
in confirmation theory mere ‘tautological evidence’, that is, in effect all our 
irrelevant knowledge. 226
So, let the hypothesis ‘God exists’ be h – he proceeds – and let the evi-
dence available be e & k. our task therefore is to establish the probability of 
h given e & k. This is written as P(h\ e&k). Now, keeping in mind the defini-
tion of a correct C-inductive argument, an argument from e to h is a correct 
C-inductive argument if (and only if) P(h\ e&k) > P(h\ k). That is, it is correct 
because taking e into consideration makes the probability of h higher than if 
only the background knowledge k was considered. Now generally, the proba-
bility that p is true given q and the probability that p is not true given q sum up 
to one (i.e. P(p\ q) + P(~p\ q) = 1). it follows from this that an argument from 
e to h is a correct P-inductive argument if (and only if) P(h\ e&k) > ½ (i.e. if 
P(h\ e&k) > P(~h\ e&k)). 227
in his argument for the existence of God, Swinburne takes e1, e2... e11 to be 
the various propositions that people bring forward as evidence for or against 
God’s existence. He begins with the cosmological argument which starts from 
the evidence e1 that ‘there is a physical universe’. in considering this argu-
ment, he assumes that there is no other relevant evidence and so k will be 
mere tautological evidence. Then P(h\ e1&k) represents the probability that 
God exists given that there is a physical universe and given mere tautological 
evidence. if P(h\ e1&k) > P(h\ k), then the cosmological argument is a correct 
C-inductive argument and inasmuch as the premises are known by all, it is a 
good one. 228
Secondly, Swinburne considers the teleological argument, which starts 
from the evidence e2 of ‘the conformity of the universe to a temporal order’. 
But since he wants to take into consideration the cumulative value of all the 
arguments, k will now include the premise of the first argument e1. So, P(h\ 
e2&k) will represent the probability that God exists, given that there is a physi-
cal universe and that it is subject to temporal order. And when considering the 
third argument from e3, k will represent the premise of the second argument 
(e1 & e2). And so on, until all the eleven arguments are considered.
226 Cf. ibid., 16-17.
227 Cf. ibid., 17.
228 Cf. ibid.
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The crucial question of Swinburne’s book, The Existence of God, is wheth-
er P(h\ e11&k) > ½. if it is the case, the probability that God exists will be 
greater than the probability that God does not exist (i.e. that P(h\ e11&k) > 
P(~h\ e11&k)).
 229 This would mean that the premises make the conclusion that 
God exists probable. The argument therefore, from the premises of the eleven 
arguments taken cumulatively to the conclusion that God exists would be a 
good P-inductive argument. That is, Swinburne’s view is that as long as the 
probability value of all the arguments in favour or against God taken together 
is greater than half (½), theism will be a justified hypothesis.
Swinburne suggests that most of the eleven arguments (taken separately 
and together) for the existence of God are good C-inductive arguments (i.e. 
P(h\ en&k) > P(h\ k), where n = 1, 2... 11). That is, their premises make it more 
probable that God exists than it would otherwise be. He notes that of course 
some of these arguments confirm the existence of God much more strongly 
than the others. He concedes that the argument against the existence of God 
from evil is a good C-inductive argument (i.e. P(h\ en&k) < P(h\ k)). He thinks 
however that it is of limited force. He further argues that the argument from 
hiddenness of God to non-existence of God and the argument from the ex-
istence of morality to the existence of God have no force (i.e. P(h\ en&k) = 
P(h\k)). Swinburne’s final verdict is that the argument from all the evidence 
considered in the eleven arguments to the existence of God is a good P-induc-
tive argument (i.e. P(h\ e11&k) > ½).
 230
While our main concern is to get the values P(h\ en&k), and eventually 
P(h\ e11&k), Swinburne’s arguments do not lead directly to these values. Ra-
ther, the arguments that he gives lead to the values of P(en\ h&k). in order to 
arrive at the values in which we are interested, Swinburne applies Bayes’ theo-
rem to the values of P(en\ h&k). The use of Bayes’ theorem in the justifi cation 
of theism is considered by many as Swinburne’s prime contribution to the phi-
losophy of religion. 231 Bayes’ theorem is expressed by the following for mula:
P(h\ e&k) = P(e\ h&k) P(h\ k)
P(e\ k)
229 Cf. ibid.
230 Ibidem.
231 Cf. chartier, G., «Richard Swinburne», 467.
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Swinburne notes that Bayes’ theorem follows directly from the axioms 
of mathematical calculus of probability. it is not necessary to go through the 
steps of deriving the theorem from the said axioms but it is interesting to 
consider the variables of which it is composed. i noted earlier, while consid-
ering the grounds on which we judge the truth of a theory, that according to 
Swinburne, the probability of a hypothesis h depends on its prior probability 
and on its explanatory power. The latter increases with the predictive power 
of h and decreases with the prior probability of e. it is this relation that is 
represented by Bayes’ theorem. As was reported, the predictive power of h is 
the measure of the probability that the observed phenomena e would occur 
if the hypothesis h is true. The predictive power of h then will be P(e\ h&k) 
while the prior probability of h (i.e. the probability of h before we consider 
any evidence) will be P(h\ k) and that of e (i.e. supposing that h is not true) as 
P(e\ k). it may be noticed that the product of these factors is the same one of 
Bayes’ theorem.
3.2. The Limits to the Arguments for the Existence of God
i have considered in Section 2 during the discussion of God’s necessity 
some indicators of why there must be a being that necessarily is. Under this 
sub-section, i would like to highlight only those issues to do with Swinburne’s 
consideration of the arguments for the existence of God that i have not al-
ready mentioned. i shall consider whether Swinburne’s arguments are a poste-
riori as he claims. i shall then take note of some criticisms of his claims about 
the simplicity of theism. Finally, i shall revisit and restate the classical view 
that it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God. if this were accepted, 
then evil would not present any serious problem for the existence of God. 
We would already know that God exists and therefore the occurrence of evil 
would not put in doubt his existence.
a) Swinburne’s Arguments: Are they a Posteriori?
Swinburne claims that the arguments that he considers in The Existence 
of God in order to reach the final conclusion about the probability of the exist-
ence of God are all a posteriori arguments. He notes that these are «arguments 
which claim that something that humans experience is grounds for believing 
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that there is a God or that there is no God.» 232 He also notes that in preferring 
this procedure, he follows what the greatest theistic philosophers of religion, 
like St. Thomas Aquinas, have generally done.
However, Swinburne summarises his procedure, in the last chapter of 
The Existence of God, entitled ‘The Balance of Probability’, as follows: «in the 
previous chapters i have urged that various occurrent phenomena are such 
that they are more to be expected, more probable, if there is a God than if 
there is not.» 233 it may therefore be seen that the arguments are: ‘if God exists, 
then humans should expect to have such experience.’ The arguments are not: 
‘given this human experience, it follows that God exists.’ Swinburne begins by 
postulating God (i.e. a being with certain attributes) and then he goes on to 
argue that, given a being with such attributes, it is to be expected (it is prob-
able) that there will be, for example, an ordered physical universe. instead of 
arguing for and stating the probability of the hypothesis ‘God exists’ given the 
phenomena observed, he argues for and states the probability that these phe-
nomena will be observed given the hypothesis ‘God exists’. There is a great 
contrast with, for example, the five ways of St. Thomas Aquinas. Apart from 
the fact that Aquinas’ ways are demonstrative arguments (at least claim to be) 
while Swinburne’s arguments seek the probability of God’s existence, they also 
start from the effect and conclude to the necessity of a cause. Herbert McCa-
be notes that in «Aquinas’ view, we do not know anything about the world 
through knowing something about God. God is never, for him, an explanation 
of the world. The movement is always in the other direction.» 234
it is clear then that Swinburne’s arguments are the reverse of what would 
be an a posteriori procedure. That they are a priori may also be seen from the 
probability that Swinburne states in each argument. it is P(en\ h&k), that is, 
the probability that the phenomenon en will be observed given that God exists 
and given tautological evidence. The probability that God exists given the 
observed phenomena – which is what we are interested in – is only reached 
by a mathematical formula (i.e. by the application of Bayes’ theorem). Swin-
burne’s arguments therefore have all the shortcomings that a priori proofs of 
the existence of God have been traditionally said to have including some that 
232 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 8.
233 Ibid., 328.
234 Mccabe, H., God and Evil: In the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, Continuum international Pu-
blishing Group, London-New York, 2010, 68.
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are stated by Swinburne himself. St. Thomas is one of those who state that 
the proofs of the existence of God must start from his effects. He explains that 
«because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition [‘God exists’] is 
not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more 
known to us, though less known in their nature, namely, by effects.» 235
b) The Justification of Theism via Simplicity
Swinburne has wanted to justify the existence of God by the use of scien-
tific criteria. He has argued that by following the same criteria, it is possible 
to show that the hypothesis ‘God exists’ is the ultimate explanation with the 
highest probability. Like i have noted, he claims that in order to show this, it 
is enough to show that the probability that God exists given the evidence we 
have is greater than the probability that God does not exist given the evidence 
we have. in other words, the probability that God exists given the evidence we 
have only needs to be greater than ½. Swinburne argues that this is, indeed, 
the case. in order to argue his case however, he gives a central role to the sim-
plicity of the hypothesis. i shall discuss here some objections that have been 
raised against his probabilistic procedure. Firstly, is a God who only probably 
exists worthy of worship? Secondly, does the criterion of simplicity have as 
much importance in scientific explanation as Swinburne claims? Finally, is 
theism simple, and is it simpler than materialism or other world-views?
With regard to the first objection, it may be recalled that Swinburne admits 
that the kind of attributes that God is said to have will determine his worthiness 
of worship. However, even before we get to this point, we need to ask ourselves 
whether one could offer unconditional and complete worship to a God whom 
one only believes to probably exist. if God is a personal being and has created 
men in order to have communion with them, can one have this relation with 
God if one thinks that God only probably exists? Domingos de Sousa asks:
Can we treat God as an hypothesis that best explains observable phenomena 
and human experience? Since new evidence could arise at any time to show 
that the hypothesis was mistaken, would this not imply that we can only 
believe tentatively? 236
235 St. thoMas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, q.2, a.1, co.
236 de sousa, D., «Epistemic Probability and Existence of God: A Kierkegaardian Critique of 
Swinburne’s Apologetic», The Heythrop Journal, 55 (2014) 45.
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Furthermore, de Sousa rightly suggests that if religious beliefs were mat-
ters of probability, we would have to formulate them more precisely in the 
form: ‘i believe that it is probable that God became incarnate in Jesus.’ i should 
think however that this is not the attitude of most people who have religious 
belief (i.e. they do not believe that it is only probable). Hence, Plantinga, 
while responding to Swinburne’s insistence on giving probabilistic arguments 
for Christian beliefs from evidence available to all, says:
When examining probabilistic arguments for the truth of Christian belief, 
i was claiming only that these arguments are not sufficient to support full 
belief, the sort of belief accorded to the great things of the Gospel by those 
who actually believe them. 237
in an earlier work, Plantinga had argued that the theistic belief was not 
and could not be just a hypothesis that explains what is observed in the world:
[it] is an enormous and in my opinion wholly false assumption to think that 
belief in God, or more broadly, the larger set of Christian (or Jewish or Mus-
lim) beliefs of which belief in God is a part, is, at any rate for most believers, 
relevantly like a scientific hypothesis. The evidence for these beliefs is not 
the fact (if it is a fact) that they properly explain some body of data. 238
i shall now proceed to consider the objection that has been made that the 
criterion of simplicity does not have such overriding importance in scientific 
investigation as Swinburne claims it to have. Like i mentioned, he considers 
that the criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to that of 
simplicity. He also argues that the criterion of scope has very little impor-
tance. He thus claims that the truth of a hypothesis depends basically on its 
simplicity and its explanatory power. 239 However, Göhner et al. argue that 
Swinburne fails to justify his claim that the criterion of fit with background 
evidence can be reduced to that of simplicity. 240 Besides they argue that his use 
237 plantinGa, A., «Rationality and Public Evidence: A Reply to Richard Swinburne», Religious 
Studies, 37 (2001) 221.
238 plantinGa, A., «on Being Evidentially Challenged», in Howard-Snyder, D. (ed.), The Eviden-
tial Argument from Evil, indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1996, 249.
239 Cf. pp. 41-43.
240 Cf. Göhner, J.; kaiser, M. i. and suhM, C. «is Simplicity an Adequate Criterion of Theory 
Choice?», in Mößner, N., Schmoranzer, S. and Weidemann C. (eds.), Richard Swinburne: Chris-
tian Philosophy in a Modern World, ontos verlag, Frankfurt, 2008, 39-40.
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of the term ‘background evidence’ is ambiguous. on one hand, he uses it to 
refer to empirical data (or phenomena or observations) and on the other, not 
to empirical data but to scientific theories. 241 Similarly, Quentin Smith argues 
that the criterion of fit with background knowledge cannot be reduced to that 
of simplicity. And, like i noted earlier, Smith argues that theism does not fit 
with the other scientific data and theories. 242
Alvin Plantinga argues in his 1979 article 243 that probabilistic arguments 
are incapable of showing the truth or falsity of theism given the occurrence 
of evil. He claims that there is no way of assigning content and hence a priori 
probability to contingent propositions in a way that is consistent both with the 
probability calculus and with intuition. 244 He examines the different solutions 
that have been proposed in order to overcome this difficulty faced by confirma-
tion theory. And when he comes to the solution proposed by Swinburne, which 
is the simplicity of a hypothesis, Plantinga says that it cannot be right because:
in the first place, the notion of simplicity as a property of propositions as 
opposed to sentences is at best problematic. Although this is a deep and im-
portant difficulty, discussing it here would take us too far afield. But even 
if we waive this problem we can see that a priori probability, if there is such 
a thing, does not depend in any straight-forward way upon simplicity. in 
particular, it is not true that the simpler a proposition, the greater its a priori 
probability. For if that were true, all logically equivalent propositions would 
be equally simple (since they have the same a priori probability) and no con-
tingent proposition could be simpler than any necessary proposition (since 
every necessary proposition has an a priori probability of 1). 245
in the same vein, Korbmacher et al. suggest that there is room for doubt 
on whether we do in fact treat simplicity as evidence of truth. 246 They argue 
that the examples that Swinburne uses to show that this is the case are not 
compelling. in general, they say, his examples do not obey the ceteris paribus 
241 Cf. ibid., 37-38.
242 Cf. sMith, Q., «Swinburne’s Explanation of the Universe», 93-95.
243 Cf. plantinGa, A., «The Probabilistic Argument from Evil», Philosophical Studies, 35 (1979) 
1-53.
244 Cf. ibid., 25; 47-48.
245 Ibid., 22. The italics are in the original text.
246 Cf. korbMacher, J.; schMoranzer, S. and seide, A. «Simply False? Swinburne on Simplicity 
as Evidence of Truth», in Mößner, N., Schmoranzer, S. and Weidemann C. (eds.), Richard Swin-
burne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World, ontos verlag, Frankfurt, 2008, 39-40.
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restraint. That is, although he argues that it is simplicity that made the the-
ories in the examples preferable to others, it is clear that in his examples he 
does not keep the other factors constant. it could then be any of the other fac-
tors that are responsible for the preference of the theories. For example, they 
suggest that, although Swinburne claims that Kepler’s theory on planetary 
motion was preferred to Copernicus’ theory for its simplicity, historical facts 
show that more in its favour was that his data was much more accurate than 
any other’s (thirty times more accurate than that of Copernicus). 247
it therefore appears that no objective reasons can be given in support of the 
claim that the simpler an entity is, the more likely it is to exist uncaused... 
other confirmation theorists, including, most notably, Karl Popper, do not 
make this recommendation. 248
in brief, i have wanted to take note of some of the objections that have 
been made against Swinburne’s claim on the importance of simplicity in the 
scientific field. i do not think that it pertains to the present study to pro-
nounce itself on what are the important or best scientific procedures. Howev-
er, these objections make it clear that the foundation upon which Swinburne 
has constructed his arguments for the existence of God is not a firm one. He 
assumes that there is consensus among scientists and philosophers of science 
about the importance of the criterion of simplicity. it is clear however that this 
is not the case.
i shall now consider the third and last objection. This is the objection that 
Swinburne’s hypothesis of theism is neither simple nor simpler than material-
ism or other world-views. To begin with, some critics have claimed that Swin-
burne hardly distinguishes between the simplicity of the hypothesis ‘God exists’ 
and the ontological simplicity of God. Thus, Bruce Langtry notes that «even 
if There is a God is very h-simple, and God’s de re necessary properties are very 
simple ones, it does not follow that God is very ontologically simple.» 249
Furthermore, Jeremy Gwiazda claims that Swinburne’s case from math-
ematical simplicity for the probability of God’s existence is not successful. He 
says that Swinburne relies heavily on the ‘principle P,’ which states that «hy-
247 Cf. ibid., 53-54.
248 parson, K., God and the Burden of Proof, 99.
249 lanGtry, B., «Swinburne on Simplicity of Theism», European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 
3 (2011) 421.
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potheses attributing infinite values of properties to objects are simpler than ones 
attributing finite values.» 250 Swinburne’s inductive probabilistic argument for 
theism almost wholly rests on this principle. «in particular, Swinburne uses the 
principle to argue that P(h\k) is high. But it is a principle which i argue is not 
adequately supported by Swinburne. i also suggest that the principle may be 
false.» 251 The P(h\k) or the intrinsic probability of theism is an important ele-
ment in the calculation of P(h\ e&k), that is, the probability of theism given all 
the evidence that we have. Swinburne claims that the latter value is high because 
the former value is also high. Now, according to Swinburne, the intrinsic prob-
ability of theism is high basically because it is simple. 252
Gwiazda goes further to argue that even if we were to grant Swinburne 
that principle P is true, the God according to Swinburne’s argument would 
not be simple. He notes that the ‘infinite properties’ that Swinburne assigns 
to God are in fact limited. «The crucial point is that God is not maximally 
omniscient or omnipotent, but rather is restrictedly omniscient and omnip-
otent. God is perfectly free, and due to this, cannot be maximally omniscient 
or omnipotent.» 253 in other words, Swinburne takes freedom to be the most 
important attribute and so grants it the highest degree. This makes it neces-
sary for him to limit God’s omnipotence and omniscience in order for them 
to be compatible with God’s perfect freedom. However, Gwiazda argues that 
since Swinburne claims that ‘zero’ is as simple as ‘infinity,’ then a God who is 
maximally omnipotent and omniscient with zero freedom is simpler than the 
God in Swinburne’s hypothesis. 254
in a reply to Gwiazda, Swinburne concedes the points made by him 
about the shortcomings of God’s simplicity as developed in Coherence of Theism 
and in The Existence of God. Swinburne however explains that he solved those 
problems in The Christian God:
i did however give what i regard as a satisfactory (although perhaps some-
times unclear) justification in CG, 151-158, when i claimed that these three 
properties understood in my way all follow from a very simple property of 
250 Gwiazda, J., «The Existence of God and the Principle P», Sophia, 48 (2009) 394.
251 Ibid., 393.
252 Cf. swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 93.
253 Gwiazda, J., «Richard Swinburne’s Argument to the Simplicity of God via the infinite», Reli-
gious Studies, 45 (2009) 488.
254 Cf. ibid., 492.
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‘having pure, limitless intentional power’. i acknowledge that i should have 
repeated that account in The Existence of God. So i will repeat it here in a 
clearer form. 255
So, in this new strategy, Swinburne begins with the attribute of infinite 
power and considers that he succeeds in fitting in well the other attributes. in-
deed, one wonders why Swinburne, if he believes that the formulation in The 
Christian God succeeded in solving this not so light difficulty in a satisfactory 
manner, did not use it in his subsequent works like Providence and the Problem 
of Evil and the second edition of The Existence of God. However, we need not 
press this point much farther. What is clear is that even in this clearer form 
that he offers, he still insists on the attributes being ‘understood in my way.’ 
That is, it is not omniscience or omnipotence in an unqualified way but in a 
restricted way. Thus, he maintains that «Gwiazda is right to point out that 
the simplest kind of omniscience, taken on its own, is incompatible with om-
nipotence defined in a non-restricted way, and also with perfect freedom so 
defined.» 256
it is apparent then that the clearer form of explaining God’s simplicity is 
only a form of affirming the infinite properties of God without having to make 
explicit the limits that are implied. My view however is that if the simplicity of 
God depends on the order in which we explain his attributes and on formula-
tions that leave unsaid what is implied, then it does not seem to be intrinsic to 
him but only in our conception (i.e. in our mind). Moreover, apart from these 
uses of ‘infinity’ limited by definition, Quentin Smith claims that Swinburne 
uses various senses of infinity without clearly distinguishing them. Hence, he 
suggests that «a critic of Swinburne’s argument may say that his thesis that 
theism is a ‘simpler’ hypothesis than materialism is the conclusion of an argu-
ment based on an equivocation on ‘infinity.’» 257
i have here limited myself to the main element of Swinburne’s inductive 
argument for theism (i.e. its simplicity). There are however other objections 
that have been raised against his whole inductive probabilistic project in fa-
vour of theism. Let me mention just one of these. it is what Plantinga calls 
255 swinburne, R., «How the Divine Properties Fit Together: Reply to Gwiazda», Religious Studies 
45 (2009) 495.
256 Ibid., 497.
257 sMith, Q., «Swinburne’s Explanation of the Universe», Religious Studies, 34 (1998) 93.
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the ‘principle of dwindling probabilities.’ 258 William Hasker is of the view that 
Swinburne has not adequately dealt with the issue.
This principle comes into play in cases where we are evaluating the pro-
bability of a fairly complex hypothesis, comprising a number of logically 
independent propositions...
The difficulty, of course, is that, even if the individual probabilities are re-
asonably high, multiplying them together causes them to diminish rapidly. 
For instance, if each of the four probabilities on the right side of the formula 
is a healthy 0.7, the product of the four will be only 0.24, about one chance 
in four.
i conclude that Swinburne still has a lot of work to do, if he is to overcome 
the problem of dwindling probabilities. 259
in Swinburne’s defence, Agnaldo Cuoco says that the dwindling effect 
results from Plantinga’s failure to apply correctly the Bayesian method of cal-
culating the probabilities concerned. 260 Cuoco however admits that, firstly, 
«Swinburne’s insistence on the principle of simplicity sometimes obscures 
the crucial importance of conditionalization in a Bayesian analysis.» 261 And 
secondly, «strong belief is not the same as certainty,» 262 which means that 
Plantinga is right in claiming that probabilistic arguments cannot be sufficient 
ground for the kind of beliefs that are contained in the gospels.
All in all, i cannot discuss the difficulties with which Swinburne’s in-
ductive probabilistic proposal in defence of theism is faced in greater detail 
than i have. i believe however that i have managed to show that many legit-
imate objections have been raised against it, to which Swinburne has not yet 
responded satisfactorily. Whereas there is no doubt that he has meticulously 
laid out his defence following the scientific criteria, it is evident that the 
object with which he is dealing does not let itself be handled by this meth-
od. i suggested earlier that when it comes to dealing with infinite Being, a 
metaphysical approach is the most adequate one. «it is not just that natural 
258 Cf. plantinGa, A., Warranted Christian Belief, oxford University Press, New York, 2000, 280.
259 hasker, W., «is Christianity Probable? Swinburne’s Apologetic Programme», Religious Studies, 
38 (2002) 256.
260 Cf. cuoco portuGal, A., «Plantinga and the Bayesian Justification of Beliefs», Veritas (Porto 
Alegre), 57 (2012) 21-23.
261 Ibid., 21.
262 Ibid., 24.
CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiáSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 26 / 2016 251
The Providence of God accordinG To richard Swinburne
theology belongs to metaphysics, but that, at least since the Greeks, meta-
physics is its natural place.» 263
i shall under the next heading present the steps involved in the move-
ment up to the infinite Uncaused Being. Although Swinburne and many of 
his interlocutors reject the possibility of a deductive proof of the existence of 
God, the discussion in Section 2 has shown that there are many indicators of 
the necessity of God’s existence. The objective of the next heading will be to 
restate this classical view while relating it to some of the ideas that have come 
up during the discussion of Swinburne’s views about God’s existence and es-
sence.
c) Deductive Arguments
i have highlighted Swinburne’s view that reason can only reach a prob-
able conclusion about the existence of God. i shall argue here that deductive 
proofs for the existence of God are possible. However, there is a need of a 
clarification of what it means to prove or demonstrate the existence of God. 
Like Jacques Maritain notes, to «prove or to demonstrate is, in everyday us-
age, to render evident that which of itself was not evident.» 264However, firstly, 
like i highlighted earlier, the existence of God is evident in itself although not 
to us. Secondly:
what our arguments render evident for us is not God Himself, but the tes-
timony of Him contained in his vestiges, His signs or His ‘mirrors’ here 
below... They give us only evidence of the fact that the divine existence must 
be affirmed, or of the truth of the attribution of the predicate to the subject 
in the assertion ‘God exists’. 265
Before i present the elements involved in a deductive proof of the exist-
ence of God, i wish to begin with a brief consideration of the alternative that 
Swinburne proposes. He says that it is possible to have several inductive argu-
ments which cumulatively could make the existence of God more probable. 
He notes that there has been an unfortunate tendency in recent philosophy 
263 Moros, E. R., «Presupuestos de la demostración de la existencia de Dios», 431, foot note 35.
264 Maritain, J., Approaches to God, Collier Books, New York, 1962, 24.
265 Ibidem.
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of religion of considering that arguments cannot be cumulative. At this point, 
i do not wish to take a position on whether arguments can be cumulative or 
not. i wish however to highlight a deficiency in Swinburne’s defence of this 
possibility.
He says that clearly arguments (whether inductive or deductive) may 
back up or weaken each other. 266 He argues that the argument from ‘all stu-
dents have long hair’ to ‘Smith has long hair’ is invalid, and so is the argument 
from ‘Smith is a student’ to ‘Smith has long hair’. He says that if you put the 
arguments ‘all students have long hair’ and ‘Smith is a student’ together, you 
can reach a valid conclusion that ‘Smith has long hair’. The first arguments 
however are not valid because no argument from one premise can be valid. 
The case here therefore is not of a cumulative effect of two arguments but 
rather one of forming a valid argument from two premises. Swinburne there-
fore needs to find another explanation for why arguments can be cumulative.
i shall now proceed to Swinburne’s view that deductive proofs for the 
existence of God are not possible. Although he strongly defends the cosmo-
logical argument as a good argument in favour of the existence of God, he 
nevertheless declares that no argument from any such starting points to the 
existence of God is deductively valid. 267 He argues that if an argument from 
the existence of a complex physical universe to the existence of God were de-
ductively valid, then it would be incoherent to assert that a complex physical 
universe exists and that God does not exist. Swinburne does not think that it 
is. Hence, he argues that God’s existence cannot be logically necessary. And 
when some philosophers speak of metaphysical necessity, it does not make 
sense to him. The only necessity that he appropriates to God is the factual one 
(i.e. as a brute fact that is the terminus of explanation).
i have defended the view that God’s existence is not only metaphysically 
but also logically necessary. i have argued that although the proposition ‘God 
exists’ may not be evident to us (ad nos), it may be shown to be evident in 
itself (per se). Since it is accepted by all that a proposition in which the predi-
cate is included in the subject is evident and necessary, showing that existence 
pertains to the essence of God, whether by a demonstration or by any other 
means would show that the proposition is necessary. i shall argue here that it 
266 Cf. p. 86.
267 Cf. p. 84.
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is possible to show this by demonstration. i have reported Swinburne’s evalua-
tion of some deductive proofs of the existence of God that have been provided 
throughout history.
i have also highlighted Swinburne’s view about St. Thomas’ five ways. 
Apart from the fifth (the teleological argument), which he considers to have 
value only as a probable argument, he considers the other four ways as Aqui-
nas’ least successful pieces of philosophy. St. Thomas’ ways start from the being 
of things, which we capture directly by our intellect. This provides him with 
a necessary starting point, from which it is possible to reach a necessary con-
clusion. Maritain expresses these ideas that are requisite in order to grasp the 
demonstrative value of the five ways and other deductive arguments:
What is it, then, that a philosopher ought to know so as to be in condition 
to grasp on the level of critical reflection the demonstrative value of the 
philosophic proofs of God’s existence? He ought to know that the intellect 
differs from sense by nature, not just by degree; that what it is looking for in 
things is Being; and that Being is, to one degree or another, intelligible or 
attainable by the intellect... 268
Swinburne’s arguments, on the other hand, do not start from the being 
of things. They start from phenomena – which are contingent – and so no 
necessary conclusion can be reached from them. The being of phenomena is 
only propositional. Like Gilson notes, «[from] the fact that existence is not 
includable in our concepts, it immediately follows that, to the full extent to 
which it is made up of concepts, philosophical speculation itself is existentially 
neutral.» 269 So, whereas, «relatively few philosophers today would accept that 
there are good deductive proofs,» 270 i suggest that a return to the procedure 
which does not leave being aside would greatly enrich philosophical specula-
tion. This is so because what we are interested in and what leads us to seek an 
explanation is the real existence of God and of the things.
i shall now proceed to present the main issues and concerns involved 
in deductive proofs of the existence of God. The main question would be: if 
the being of the things that we observe is necessary, why do they need an ex-
268 Maritain, J., Approaches to God, 31.
269 Gilson, E., Being and Some Philosophers, 2 ed., Pontifical institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toron-
to, 2005 (reprint), 4.
270 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 14.
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planation of their existence? Furthermore, how do we arrive at the necessary 
Uncaused Cause and why must it be essentially at a different level? And finally, 
why must the Uncaused Cause be only one?
While the various deductive proofs of the existence of God have different 
starting points (as may be seen from Aquinas’ five ways), for brevity’s sake, i 
wish to suggest that what is common to them is our recognition of the com-
position in the things. We recognise that being (esse) is common to all things 
but each thing is in a certain way (i.e. each thing has a different essence). in 
other words, being does not belong to the essence of the things. otherwise 
we would not be able to conceive their essences without conceiving being as 
part of them. 271 Therefore, we ask ourselves what or who is the cause of this 
composition and above all of the esse which does not belong to the things.
The central metaphysical point in this transit consists in that once the being 
(ens) appears to us to be composed or structured by essence (what it is) and 
by esse (that by which it is), the question of why the being is should imme-
diately arise. 272
The search for an answer to this takes us all the way to a being that is sim-
ple because any cause that is composed also asks for the explanation (cause) of 
its composition and being. in other words, the composition of the things leads 
us to recognise that the being of things is not proper to them but is received 
from Another, to whom being is proper. St. Thomas explains that the esse of a 
thing cannot have its cause in the essence or quiddity of the thing:
Now being itself cannot be caused by the form or quiddity of a thing (by 
‘caused’ i mean by an efficient cause), because that thing would then be its 
own cause and it would bring itself into being, which is impossible. it fo-
llows that everything whose being is distinct from its nature must have being 
from another. And because everything that exists through another is redu-
ced to that which exists through itself as to its first cause, there must be a 
reality that is the cause of being for all other things, because it is pure being. 
if this were not so, we would go on to infinity in causes, for everything that 
is not pure being has a cause of its being, as has been said. 273
271 Cf. st. thoMas aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Ch. 4, par 6. The translation used here is the one 
of the Pontifical institute of Mediaeval Studies (2 ed) by Armand Maurer, 1968.
272 González, A. L., Teología Natural, 93.
273 st. thoMas aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Ch. 4, par 7.
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Prior to the above passage, St. Thomas argues that there can only be one 
being that exists through itself (i.e. a being that is Pure Act). After showing 
that there is no matter-form composition in separate substances (i.e. the soul, 
intelligences and the First Cause), he goes on to argue that – except for the 
First Cause – «their simplicity is not so great as to free them from all poten-
tiality and thus render them pure act.» 274 St. Thomas says that these separate 
substances have the composition of being-essence. 275
From this it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless per-
haps there is a reality whose quiddity is its being. This reality, moreover, 
must be unique and primary; because something can be multiplied only by 
adding a difference... Now, granted that there is a reality that is pure being, 
so that being itself is subsistent, this being would not receive the addition 
of a difference, because then it would not be being alone but being with the 
addition of a form... it follows that there can be only one reality that is iden-
tical with its being. in everything else, then, its being must be other than its 
quiddity, nature or form. 276
it is after arguing here that not even spiritual substances are free from 
composition that St. Thomas goes on to argue in the passage that i cited above 
for the necessity of a simple being that is Pure Being and from whom all oth-
ers must have received being. Therefore, given that all beings that we observe 
have received their being (i.e. they are composed), we conclude the necessity 
of a being who has not received esse (i.e. who is not composed) and who gives 
being to all. And there cannot be an infinite regress of causes because our 
starting point is the esse of the things which is evident. if we did not posit the 
First Uncaused Cause, we would deny what is evident. St. Thomas defends 
this Aristotelian doctrine 277 as follows:
in all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate cau-
se, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause. But, when 
you suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the 
first cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an 
274 wippel, J. F., Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, The Catholic University of America 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1984, 109.
275 Cf. St. thoMas aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Ch. 4, par 6.
276 Ibidem.
277 Cf. aristotle, Metaphysics, ii, 2, 994a 1-19.
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infinite regress among efficient causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, 
all the other causes, which are intermediate, will be suppressed. But this is 
manifestly false. We must, therefore, posit that there exists a first efficient 
cause. This is God. 278
Thus, from the composition of being and essence in all things that we 
observe, we are led to the necessity of a being from whom they must have re-
ceived their being and who has not received being. This being can only be one. 
on the other hand, Swinburne’s only explanation for there being one God is 
that it is a simpler theory. However, according to his theory of simplicity, we 
postulate only as many substances as are necessary to account for the observa-
ble data. And, «of course, it is often the case that only a theory that is less than 
perfectly simple can satisfy the other criteria (for example, explanatory power) 
for probable truth.» 279 There would not therefore be a problem in postulating 
a further substance if this way we account better for what we observe.
And so, when it comes to the problem of evil, which is the main subject of 
this study, it seems that to postulate a second divine being (i.e. a second God) 
would provide a hypothesis with much greater explanatory power. it would 
provide an easy and satisfactory theodicy and it would not go against the cri-
terion of simplicity, which is the only reason that he has for postulating only 
one God. Now, in our world we observe many good things but also many bad 
things. We could attribute the bad things to an evil divine being – the way, for 
example, the Manicheans did 280 – as a solution to the great dilemma of how a 
perfectly good being brings about evil. it should be noted that in The Existence 
of God, Swinburne concedes that evil counts against the existence of God. if 
therefore we insist that there is only one God, and that it is to him that evil 
must be attributed, it must be on the basis of a different criterion from the one 
of simplicity. A metaphysical deduction like the one above provides stronger 
grounds for holding that there is only one God.
it remains now to consider the precision that the classical philosophers 
add that the infinite regress that is ruled out is one of essential causes. And 
here, we may note two essential (metaphysical) differences of God from all 
other causes: first, that he is uncaused (i.e. he does not receive being from 
278 st. thoMas aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, i, 13, par 33.
279 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 53.
280 Cf. st. thoMas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ii.ii, q.25, a.5, co.
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another); secondly, that his causality is transcendental while that of all other 
causal agents is predicamental. That is, only God can give esse to others be-
cause esse is proper to him (only he is Pure Being). All the other causal agents 
cannot give esse (being) but only fieri (becoming). So, the causality of all agents 
other than God is, at most, that of substantial change.
While the second causes explain the fieri of the effect, the uncaused cause 
accounts for the esse of the cause, the causal activity and of the effect itself. 
Therefore, if a cause exists, it is necessary to go all the way back to a First 
Cause which makes it to be: the cause of the being of things and of all crea-
ted effect. 281
The following considerations will make the above points clearer: While 
we praise Michelangelo for ‘creating’ the Pietà, it is clear that we speak in a 
different way from when we speak of God creating the universe or anything 
in it. Creation by God is traditionally referred to with the formula ‘ex nihilo’. 
What this means is that before God creates something, there isn’t anything 
and then by a simple act of the will the thing comes to be. To create from 
‘nothing’ does not mean that the material from which God creates is ‘nothing-
ness’, since nothingness does not exist. That is, God gives being to something 
that previously was not. God did not create the universe from anything. on 
the other hand, Michelangelo needed a block of marble to make the Pietà. 
The block already was (i.e. had being) in a different way and Michelangelo 
makes it be in another way.
According to Swinburne, saying that the Pietà was made by Michelangelo 
would be a sufficient explanation of its existence (otherwise we would fall into 
the completist fallacy). Such an explanation however would only account for 
how the Pietà came to be a Pietà (i.e. its way of being or essence) and not its 
being (existence). it would explain its becoming (fieri) and not its being (esse). 
Similarly, although Swinburne suggests that the complex physical universe 
could have formed from matter rearranging itself in various combinations, 
even if God did not exist, we can still ask how this matter came to be. The 
matter already was (existed). Therefore, whatever agent or process that may 
have combined the matter in the various ways and steps in order for it to 
develop into the differentiated complex universe did not give it esse but only 
281 González, A. L., Teología Natural, 93.
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fieri. There is still room for asking who or what gave being to the matter that 
rearranges itself. Swinburne’s method however does not allow him to go fur-
ther and for that reason considers it absurd to think that there could ever be 
«explanations of such things as the origin of our galaxy.» 282
in conclusion, if we have a necessary starting point for an argument, it is 
possible to reach a necessary conclusion. in other words, it is possible to con-
struct a deductive proof. For the arguments to the existence of God, we have 
such a starting point in the being (esse) of the things which is universal, evident 
and necessary. if on the other hand we have phenomena for our starting point, 
we cannot expect to reach a necessary conclusion. Since Richard Swinburne’s 
arguments start from phenomena, it is to be expected that they only arrive at 
a probable conclusion. However, it is clear that if we do not limit ourselves 
to phenomena, our reason should be able to reach greater heights and infer 
the necessary existence of the Pure Being from whom all things have received 
their being. Moreover, if we followed Swinburne’s procedure consistently, 
postulating a second ‘divine Being’ responsible for evil would be a simpler 
theory than postulating only one. That we do not must follow from something 
more compelling than simplicity (e.g. metaphysical deduction).
d) Conclusion
in conclusion, Swinburne’s work about the attributes and existence of 
God has received wide-ranging evaluation. i have highlighted only some of 
this. The aim of this chapter has not been to discuss exhaustively Swinburne’s 
categories of God and arguments for the existence of God but to place his 
views on divine providence in context. i have highlighted various inadequate 
aspects of his treatment of the divine attributes. i have suggested that these 
shortcomings lead to an inadequate conception of God’s providence.
i have noted that the divine attributes that he proposes are limited by 
requiring them to be coherent with what we can expect of the persons that we 
know (i.e. human persons). is the being with such attributes God or is he sim-
ply a superman? Furthermore, given the inadequacy of the categories of God, 
a pertinent question that results is one that was suggested by Richard Swin-
burne himself: is such a God worthy of worship and is he the God believed in 
282 swinburne, R., The Existence of God, 76.
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by Christianity and the other Western religions? With respect to the proofs of 
God’s existence, which as i have reported Swinburne considers cannot be de-
monstrative but only probable, should one be expected to offer unconditional 
and complete worship to a God that only probably exists?
i have on my part suggested, like many philosophers in the classical and 
Christian traditions, that the way to follow is to seek a demonstration of the 
existence of God. There does not seem to be any weighty motive for aban-
doning the classical view that this is possible. By restating this classical view 
and comparing it with Swinburne’s theory of explanation, it has become clear 
that the human quest for an explanation of everything that exists asks for more 
than a probable explanation. Moreover, once we attain the certainty of God’s 
existence through a demonstration or any other way (e.g. by faith), the prob-
lem of evil presents itself in a different form: it will no longer be a cause of 
doubt about God’s existence although it will still present some questions that 
will need answers.
Therefore, a change from the inductive-logical approach of confirmation 
theory to a more metaphysical approach would give Swinburne better results 
about the attributes of God and about the fact of his existence. in the same 
vein, William Hasker suggests that the failure of Swinburne’s apologetic pro-
gram for Christianity is not owed to the Christian doctrine itself. Rather, he 
argues, all attempts to defend complete worldviews by Swinburne’s approach 
would face the same fate.
The moral to be drawn is not that Christianity is unworthy of acceptan-
ce, but rather that human beings who wish to reach conclusions about the 
general character of life and the universe are best advised to employ some 
method other than Swinburnean confirmation theory.» 283
283 hasker, W., «is Christianity Probable? Swinburne’s Apologetic Programme», 257.
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